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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the effect of electoral competition on governance along three dimen-
sions: choice of public good projects, performance of bureaucrats, and quality of bureau-
crats.
The first chapter examines how electoral competition affects bureaucrats’ performance
in implementing policies chosen by politicians. There are two competing mechanisms: re-
election concerns and access to long term incentives. To isolate these mechanisms, a unique
dataset from India is constructed by matching details of bureaucrats’ work histories with
public good projects under the Member of Parliament Local Area Development (MPLAD)
scheme. The main results show that bureaucrats approve projects faster when the incum-
bent politician’s probability of winning is higher. Moreover, bureaucrats perform better
when they are up for promotion and when they know that the politician is likely to be
in office at the time of promotion. These findings suggest that access to dynamic incen-
tives is the dominant mechanism through which political competition affects bureaucrats’
performance.
The second chapter examines the role of electoral pressures on the type of local public good
projects chosen by politicians. The analysis proceeds in two steps: firstly, a nationally
iv
representative household survey from India is used to investigate the effect of wealth on
the types of projects demanded by households. Secondly, a project-level dataset for local
public goods provided under the MPLAD scheme is constructed to compare the allocation
decisions of politicians. The identification strategy takes advantage of an information shock
that occurred as a result of electoral redistricting in India and changed the probability of
winning for incumbents. The results confirm the elite capture hypothesis: in the absence
of electoral pressures, politicians are more likely to spend on projects that are desired by
the rich.
The third chapter examines the effect of electoral competition on politician’s incentives in
influencing the assignment of bureaucrats across administrative districts. Bureaucrats can
be of two types: technocrats who are efficient in performing various tasks, and loyalists who
execute policies according to the wishes of the politicians. Politicians in high competition
constituencies have a greater incentive to choose technocrats as their better performance
can help them get re-elected. This hypothesis is tested using data from India.
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1Chapter 1
Bureaucrats and Politicians: How Does Electoral Competition Affect
Bureaucratic Performance
1.1 Introduction
Political competition is said to yield benefits to the citizens just as competition in eco-
nomic markets yields benefits to consumers. 1 There is a large theoretical literature and
an increasing number of empirical studies that show that lack of political competition may
lead to adverse policy outcomes compared to competitive constituencies.2 The underlying
mechanism that drives these results is that due to re-election concerns, the voters gain in-
fluence in disciplining the politicians only when political competition is high. While these
studies mostly examine policy choices made by politicians, the implementation of these
policies by bureaucrats also matters for governance. 3
In the above context, the question this chapter addresses is: how does political competition
affect the bureaucrats’ performance? If re-election concerns are also an important deter-
minant of project implementation, then we should find that bureaucrats perform worse in
less competitive constituencies. 4 Contrary to this prediction, using data from India, this
1See Bardhan and Yang (2004) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) for a discussion on this.
2Besley et. al (2010) show that lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic
growth. Nath (2014a) shows that in absence of political competition, local elites exert disproportionate
influence on the allocation of spending on local public goods. Brown and Hunter (1999); Lake and Baum
(2001) and Hecock (2006) show that competition increases the level of spending.
3The bureaucrats we have in mind are career civil servants who enter the bureaucracy through a meri-
torious entrance exam. Since they are non-elected government officials, the only way political competition
can affect their performance is through the influence exerted by politicians.
4The effect of re-election concerns on bureaucrats’ performance has been studied by Roggers (2014).
Using data from Nigeria he shows that politicians in high competition constituencies are more likely to del-
egate public good projects to autonomous bureaucrats rather than governmental agencies. The autonomous
agencies, on an average, perform better and hence he finds a positive relationship between competition and
2study finds that bureaucrats perform better when the incumbent politician’s probability
of winning is higher.
In this chapter, we introduce another important mechanism that rationalizes these results.
This is related to the ability of the politicians to provide incentives to the bureaucrats.
In low competition constituencies, the incumbents typically have a high probability of re-
turning to office in the next term (assuming no term limits). This provides them with
an additional way of incentivizing bureaucrats that their counterparts in competitive con-
stituencies do not have: promising future rewards. The access to dynamic contracts enables
the incumbents in low competition areas to implement higher effort levels and hence we
get a negative relationship between electoral competition and bureaucrat’s performance.
Our measure of bureaucratic performance is the time taken to approve local public goods
projects. The details of projects are obtained from Members of Parliament Local Area
Development (MPLAD) scheme. Each member of parliament (MP) gets a fixed sum of
money to spend on infrastructure projects within his constituency. The politician has full
control over the type of project, the cost and the location. These projects, however, have
to be approved by the bureaucrats in the administrative district where they are to be
constructed. We use work histories of bureaucrats to match them with individual projects
under the MPLAD scheme. This allows direct identification of the bureaucrats who ap-
proved the projects and how long they took to sanction them.
To identify the causal effect of political competition on bureaucratic performance, we take
advantage of a previously unexplored information shock that resulted in an effective term
limit for some incumbents. The shock we exploit is the announcement of changes in reserva-
bureaucratic performance.
3tion status of some of the constituencies as result of re-districting of all electoral boundaries
in India.5 When these boundaries were redefined, the population shares of minority groups
changed as well, resulting in changes in the reservation status accordingly. 6 The an-
nouncement of the changes was made in December 2007 and they were to be enforced in
the 2009 elections. The incumbents who were affected by this change knew that their prob-
ability of winning in 2009 was zero. The politicians in the control group were not affected
by the news and therefore their probability of winning does not change. We compare the
bureaucratic performance in the two groups before and after this shock. The differences-
in-difference (DID) strategy gives us a causal effect of change in political competition on
the bureaucratic performance.
Our results show that as the probability of winning goes to zero due to the information
shock, the average sanctioning time increases by 13%. Now, probability of winning going to
zero means that the incumbent’s re-electoral motives become weaker. Moreover, since the
bureaucrats know that the politician is not going to get re-elected, any promise of future
rewards made by the politicians are not credible. Since both the reelection concerns and
access to dynamic contracts shut down with the exogenous shock, this result by itself does
not help us isolate the two channels.
In order to identify which of the mechanisms drives the effect of electoral competition on
bureaucratic performance, we compare the sanctioning times of bureaucrats in constituen-
cies that are a party stronghold with those that are not. The variable stronghold is a
dummy which takes value 1 if the same party won all four elections prior to the period
of study. This is our measure of competition - incumbents in strongholds have a high
5Reservation of a constituency for a minority group means that only those candidates who belong to the
minority group can contest elections.
6The electoral boundaries did not change throughout the period of the study (1999-2009). The an-
nouncement was made in the middle of the 2004-2009 legislative term. The new boundaries came into force
in the 2009 elections, at the end of the period.
4probability of winning again and hence face very little electoral pressure. The results of
this empirical model tell us what happens when we move from probability of winning close
to half (non-strongholds) towards probability of winning close to one (strongholds).
Our results show that in constituencies with party strongholds, projects are sanctioned
11% faster. This means that bureaucrats perform better in constituencies where probabil-
ity of winning for politicians is higher. Taken together with the results from the natural
experiment, our findings are consistent with the dynamic contracts mechanism: the politi-
cians in low competition constituencies have longer tenures and therefore have access to
dynamic contracts that provide better incentives to bureaucrats. This in turn improves
bureaucratic performance. However, if probability of winning goes to zero, the promise of
future rewards are no longer credible and hence bureaucrats take longer to approve projects.
One of the empirical concerns we need to address is that of selection: politicians in
strongholds may be able to get better performing bureaucrats and that may drive the
results rather than incentives/ability of politicians to monitor the bureaucrats. In order to
control for selection, we take advantage of the fact that the administrative and electoral
boundaries do not perfectly overlap in India. A single administrative district may have
two or three electoral constituencies that overlap with it. Since the bureaucrat sits in
an administrative district and the politician is the elected representative of the electoral
constituencies, we have situations where one bureaucrat may deal with two or even three
politicians. Comparing the performance of a single bureaucrat with multiple politicians
helps us deal with the selection problem.
It may be argued that better performance of bureaucrats in strongholds may have nothing
to do with incentives, but instead be due to rent-seeking motives. Politicians and bureau-
5crats may collude to push certain types of projects faster in order to gain rents. In order
to alleviate these concerns, we provide two pieces of evidence. Firstly, we show that there
is no systematic bias in types of projects that are sanctioned faster. All types of projects -
roads, water, health, and irrigation - have significantly less delays in strongholds. Secondly,
we explicitly look at the tenures of the bureaucrats to construct measures of how far they
are from promotions. We find that bureaucrats perform better in the year that they are
up for promotion. Moreover, they perform worse when they know that the politician is not
likely to be in office at the time of promotion. These results suggest that bureaucrats are
indeed responding to incentives.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows: firstly, we examine
a hitherto unexplored mechanism that connects electoral competition to bureaucratic per-
formance: access to dynamic contracts. Secondly, we develop an empirical methodology
to identify the causal effect of electoral competition on bureaucratic performance and to
isolate the mechanism that drives the relationship. Finally, we construct a rich and disag-
gregated dataset that allows us to [a] directly observe the behavior of bureaucrats and [b]
control for selection and unobserved abilities that typically pose a threat to identification
of causal mechanisms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides details of the institu-
tional background: the bureaucrats and the politicians as well as the way in which they
interact in our setting. In section 1.3, we outline how the alternative mechanisms work
through the lens of a canonical efficiency wage model that is adapted to match our set-
ting. We provide details of the data and our empirical identification strategy in sections
1.4 and 1.5 respectively. While section 1.6 provides empirical results, section 1.7 concludes.
61.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 The Bureaucrats
The bureaucrats I study in this chapter belong to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS).
These IAS officers are federal government employees recruited through a nationwide com-
petitive examination conducted by the independent Union Public Service Commission. A
few IAS officers within each state may be recruited through the State Civil Services. The
latter ones are posted only within the state and typically do not hold positions in the
ministries or departments in New Delhi. 7
Once the direct recruits are chosen, they all undergo training together. Thereafter, they
are assigned to one of the states in a quasi-random manner and this assigned state is known
as their Cadre. They train under their assigned superiors for about four to five years in
different districts. They are subsequently assigned to a district as the head administrator.
This post is known as collector or district magistrate 8. In terms of their career path, the
bureaucrats can serve as collectors roughly between years 5-16 of their careers. In their
9th year, they are promoted to the junior administrative grade. There is no screening:
everyone is promoted. 9 This is basically a salary hike. It is in the 13th and the 16th years
that the promotions are based on screening of the bureaucrats.
As collectors, the bureaucrats are responsible for law and order, collection of land revenue
and various taxes, land acquisition and land assessment, crisis administration, and serve
as the development officer. The main role of the collector relevant for this study is that he
7The officers that enter the IAS through the UPSC exam are referred to as ‘Direct Recruits’ and the
ones that come from the State Civil Services are called ‘Promotees’.
8The Promotees typically become IAS officers pretty late in their careers.
9See http://persmin.gov.in/DOPT/EmployeesCorner/Acts_Rules/IASPromotionGuideLines.pdf
7is Ex-officio Chairman of District Rural Development Authority Agency which carries out
the various developmental activities. Any development project that has to be executed in
the district must be approved by the collector.
The IAS officers are civil servants and, as per the directives of the Constitution of India,
they cannot be hired or fired by the politicians. The bureaucrats are assigned to various
posts in each state by the corresponding Department of Personnel and Training. The ex-
ecutive order of each assignment is signed by the top bureaucrat of each state known as
the Chief Secretary. There is some evidence, however, that politicians may influence the
assignments of the bureaucrats. Iyer and Mani (2012) show that when the leader of the
party in power in a state changes, the probability of reassignments of bureaucrats goes
up. Hence, politicians may use the threat of reassigning the bureaucrats to different posts
as a control mechanism. Moreover, the politicians can potentially influence bureaucrats’
job assignments once they are up for the promotions described above. Later, this chapter
explores how political competition affects the ability of the politicians to use these promo-
tions as an incentive mechanism.
1.2.2 The Politicians
India has a federal parliamentary system of democracy. The parliament is the supreme
legislative body. There are two houses in the parliament - the lower house is called the
Lok Sabha (House of the People) and members of this house are directly elected by the
citizens. The upper house is called the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the members
of this house are elected by the state legislative assemblies.
This analysis will focus on the members of parliament (MPs) in the Lok Sabha. There are
8543 Lok Sabha constituencies. In accordance with the Constitution, elections are held every
five years where candidates are selected through universal suffrage. India has a plurality
system where the candidate with the highest vote share wins (also called "first-past-the-
post"). There is a multi-party system and candidates are allowed to contest independently
as well. There are no term limits for politicians in India.
1.2.3 The MPLAD Scheme
The local public goods projects that this chapter studies are the ones provided under the
MPLAD (Member of Parliament Local Area Development) Scheme in India. Under this
scheme, each MP is given a fixed budget of Rs. 20 million (0.5 million USD) per year to
spend anywhere within his constituency. The money can only be spent on asset building
projects. This means that politicians cannot hire employees, give grants and loans, or
purchase inventory or stock with this money. Moreover, the guidelines say that acquisi-
tion of land, building assets for individual benefits and building religious structures is not
permissible. In short, most of the permissible works are construction-based and are for
infrastructure development within the constituency.
One of the particularly relevant features of these projects is that they are highly visible.
According to the guidelines, the MP who funded the project must visit the work site and
unveil a plaque detailing the project when it is complete. The MP’s name is written on the
plaque along with how much money was spent and how long it took for the project to be
completed. The fact that the public knows these details gives the politicians an incentive
to ensure that projects are completed in a timely manner. Since the projects are executed
by the bureaucrats, this provides us a very nice set up to see whether political competition
affects the performance of bureaucrats in executing these highly visible projects.
91.2.4 The Bureaucrat-Politician Interaction
MPLAD is a unique scheme where we observe the decision of each politician separately
and can also observe the performance of bureaucrats. When the money from the fund
is allocated to the politicians, they send a recommendation letter to the collector. This
recommendation letter details the following: [1] the type of projects the politician wants
(roads, drinking water, education, etc) [2] the cost of each project and [3] the location of
each project. The total cost of various projects recommended by the MP has to be within
the fixed budget of Rs. 20 million. Hence, the politician has complete control of what to
choose, where to build, and how much to spend on each project.
Once the bureaucrat receives the recommendations for the project, the project goes through
a sanctioning process. The collector chooses the implementing agency and sends the pro-
posal to its chief engineer. The engineers inspect the site, prepare a technical and feasibility
report, and send this report back to the bureaucrat. The collector reviews the structural
and financial report and then approves the project if everything is sound. The time be-
tween receiving the recommendation and approving the project will be henceforth referred
to as the time taken to sanction the project.
The collector has the full authority over the sanctioning of the project and the politician
has no say in it 10. Over the period of this study, the official guidelines suggest that the
10The collector has full control of the technical feasibility checks. In some of the districts we visited,
we found that collectors required the chief engineers of all the implementing agencies to provide a weekly
report of the works in progress. In other districts, this practice was not enforced. If the bureaucrat does not
monitor the engineers, the reports are not sent to the collector on time. Bureaucratic delays therefore come
from two sources: [a] bureaucrat not monitoring the feasibility checks and [b] upon receiving the report,
bureaucrats taking a long time to reviewing and approving it.
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number of days taken to sanction should not exceed 45 days. Once project is sanctioned,
the engineers and lower level bureaucrats execute the project with the collector having full
control over the implementation process.
The bottomline is that the members of parliament depend completely on the bureaucrat
to carry out the projects that will ultimately bear the politician’s name. This provides
incentives to the politician to monitor the bureaucrat as his image is at stake.
1.2.5 Administrative and Electoral Boundaries
Electoral boundaries in India are intended to create constituencies such that each politician
represents the same number of citizens in the parliament. The Delimitation Commission
of India is responsible for drawing the boundaries based on population figures from the
census. Before our study period, the Delimitation Committee was set up in 1952, 1963,
and 1973. In a 1976 constitutional amendment, the government suspended delimitation
until after the 2001 census so that states’ family planning programs would not affect their
political representation in the Lok Sabha. The report of the 2001 census came in 2003 and
the new boundaries were applicable only in 2009. Hence, during the entire period of this
study, 1999-2009, the electoral boundaries remained the same.
Figure 1.1 depicts the electoral boundaries. As we can see, the size of the constituencies
are not uniform; some are large and some are small. The smaller constituencies are in areas
where the density of population is higher. This is especially true for Uttar Pradesh in the
north and West Bengal in the west.
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In contrast to electoral boundaries, the administrative boundaries are drawn based on land
area. This is done so that each district collector is responsible for land revenue, law and
order and development works for the same area of land. Unlike electoral boundaries, dis-
trict boundaries do not change over time. There are cases where district boundaries are
redrawn and this happens when the states split into two. In 1998, three of the largest
states in India split and due to this districts also split into smaller sizes. However, this
happened before our period of study and does not affect our analysis.
Since the electoral boundaries and administrative boundaries are drawn according to dif-
ferent dimensions, these boundaries do not perfectly coincide. One electoral constituency
may overlap between two administrative districts and vice versa. Figure 1.2 illustrates
a possible district-constituency overlap situation where one bureaucrat works with three
politicians at any given point in time. We exploit this feature to control for selection and
unobserved ability of bureaucrats. We provide more details of this once when we discuss
the empirical identification strategy.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
As described earlier, there are two ways in which electoral competition can affect the politi-
cian’s incentives to induce better bureaucratic performance. In order to study how these
mechanisms work, we adapt a canonical efficiency wage model with endogenous monitor-
ing to make two modifications: [a] let the wages be fixed exogenously and [b] consider a
two period dynamic contract with one-sided commitment where the principle commits to
promises of future payoffs. The model is useful for two main reasons: [1] it furthers our
understanding of how the potential mechanisms work and [2] the comparative statics de-
rived in the model provide us with testable predictions which we can use to identify which
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mechanism is at work in the data.
1.3.1 The Environment
Consider a politician (‘he’) who has a public good project in each period t that has to
be executed by a bureaucrat (‘she’). The bureaucrat has to exert an effort to implement
the project. Let et ∈ [0, 1] denote the effort level chosen by the bureaucrat in period t.
The output takes values pit ∈ {0, 1}. Putting in higher effort increases the probability of
successfully implementing the project such that Prob(pit = 1) = et. Putting in effort is
costly and to obtain an interior solution, the cost is assumed to be convex: c′(e) > 0 and
c′′(e) > 0. For simplicity, we assume that c(et) = e2t .
There are two features of the institutional setup that limit politician’s ability to directly
control the bureaucrat. Firstly, the wages of the bureaucrats are fixed and determined
exogenously. Politicians cannot affect these wages. Secondly, politicians cannot hire or fire
the bureaucrats. 11 In lieu of these direct methods of control, politicians have indirect
ways in which they can control the bureaucrat. The politicians can give a letter of recog-
nition in each period if the bureaucrat puts in effort. Let’s assume that this gives a utility
r to the bureaucrats. Secondly, and more importantly, the politicians can influence the
re-assignment of bureaucrats to other administrative districts (Iyer and Mani (2012)). If
bureaucrats perform well, politicians can reward them by providing them more lucrative
assignments in the future.
Let us now see how these two instrument of control are used by politicians to provide
11This setting is not unique to India. It exists in many other countries, especially the commonwealth
countries where there exists some form of civil service.
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incentives to the bureaucrat for putting in higher effort. At t = 0, the politician announces
that the bureaucrats will be monitored with probability qt ∈ [0, 1] in period t ∈ [1, 2]. If
the bureaucrat is monitored and is caught shirking, she does not get a letter of recogni-
tion in the current period. Moreover, the politician can further punish her in the future
by assigning her to an undesirable post (hence giving a low continuation value V ′). The
principal would like to make V ′ → −∞ since this threat would be enough to induce the
bureaucrat to work and it would mean that he will not have to monitor the bureaucrat.
However, such a threat is not credible and hence we assume that V ′ ≥ 0. Also, monitoring
is costly. Let cost of monitoring bureaucrat be C(qt) = q2t such that Cq > 0, Cqq > 0.
The second way to incentivize the bureaucrat is to promise a higher future payoff in the
form of more lucrative assignments. This is captured via the future continuation value V
which the bureaucrat discounts at rate β(φ) ∈ [0, 1] where φ is the extent of electoral com-
petition in the constituency politician represents. The discount rate depends on the level
of competition because if the electoral constituency is competitive, then the probability
of winning in the next election is low. In such an event, promises of future rewards are
less credible and the discount rate is close to zero. Hence, β′(φ) < 0. Effect of electoral
competition on optimal effort through beta will henceforth be referred to as "access to
dynamic contracts" mechanism.
The politician offers a contract (q1, q2, e1, e2) to the bureaucrat and the latter chooses e′
to maximize his own payoffs. The bureaucrat’s expected payoff in period zero is therefore
given by:
UB =
2∑
t=1
βt−1
[
w + (1− qt)r + qt1{e′t = et}r − e
′2
t
]
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Let R(e, φ) denote the present value of gross payoffs the politician gets when the project is
implemented. If the project is not implemented, he gets a zero payoff. Note that the payoff
function is concave in effort: Re(e, φ) > 0 and Ree(e, φ) < 0. This ensures a unique solu-
tion. The electoral motives are captured in this gross payoff function: when Reφ(e, φ) > 0,
it means that the marginal increase payoff when the project is implemented increases as
the extent of competition increases. This is exactly what the reelection concern motive
would suggest. To get a closed form solution, we assume R(e, φ) = R(φ)
√
e.
The politician’s expected payoffs are: UP = ∑2t=1 βt−1[R√et − q2t ].
1.3.2 The Maximization Problem
The politician’s problem can be written recursively as:
Period 1:
maxe1,q1,V,V ′ R(φ)
√
e1 − q21 + β(φ)Q(V ) (1.1)
subject to:
IC1: w + r + β(φ)V − e21 ≥ w + (1− q1)
[
r + β(φ)V
]
+ q1β(φ)V ′ (1.2)
PC1: w + r + β(φ)V − e21 ≥ 0 (1.3)
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NN: V ≥ 0; V ′ ≥ 0 (1.4)
Period 2:
Q(V ) = maxe2,q2 R(φ)
√
e2 − q22 (1.5)
subject to:
IC2: w + r − e22 ≥ w + (1− q2)r (1.6)
PC2: w + r − e22 ≥ V (1.7)
ICt represents the incentive compatibility constraint in period t and says that the payoff
the bureaucrat gets from putting in effort e′t = et is at least as much as the payoff from
shirking and putting in zero effort. The participation constraint (PCt) ensures that, in
each period, the payoff from putting in effort is at least as much as what the bureaucrat
gets when he does not work on executing the politician’s project.
In the first best scenario, the effort is observable. There is zero monitoring in both periods
and the effort level chosen by the politician is a solution to the above problem without
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the IC constraints and without q. In this scenario, the participation constraint binds at
optimum in each period. Consider the second period: if PC2 is not binding at optimum,
then the effort level can be increased without violating the constraint. This creates a con-
tradiction because it increases the politician’s payoffs. Hence, the participation constraint
binds in period two and we get eFB2 =
√
w + r − V FB. Consider now the first period. If
the participation constraint is not binding, the politician can now do two things. He can
increase e1 and increase his payoffs in period 1, or reduce V and increase his payoffs in
period 2. Hence, at optimum, the participation constraint of period one should also bind.
Solving the first period problem gives us: eFB1 =
√
w + r + βV FB.
How do the effort levels compare to the case where the politician offers a static contract
each period? In the static contract case, the politician implements the same level of effort:
es2 =
√
w + r = es1. Note that eFB1 > es1 and eFB2 < es2. This shows that by having access
to dynamic contracts, the politician can use the promise of a higher future payoff in order
to improve performance in the first period. By keeping his promise in the second period,
he gives the bureaucrat a higher payoff by reducing the effort level the bureaucrat is asked
to implement.
Let us now turn to the second-best problem defined by equations (1)-(6). Similar to the
first best scenario, e∗1 > e∗2. Even in the presence of moral hazard, the politician can
front-load the incentives to induce the bureaucrat to work harder in the first period of
the contract. To curb deviations from the contracted effort level, the politician engages in
costly monitoring. The solution to the second-best problem is collected in the following
proposition:
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Proposition 1: The unique optimal contract solving the second-best problem is
characterized by:
e∗2 =
√
(w + r − V ) (1.8)
q∗2 =
w + r − v
r
(1.9)
e∗1 = αR
2
7 [r + βV ∗]
4
7 (1.10)
q∗1 = αR
4
7 [r + βV ∗]
1
7 (1.11)
V ∗solves: 2αR
8
7 [r + βV ]
9
7 − 1
r
− 316R(w + r − V )
−7
4 = 0 (1.12)
V ′∗ = 0 (1.13)
where α = 8−27 .
Proof: See Appendix. 
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1.3.3 Comparative Statics: Effect of Electoral Competition
We now examine how the optimal level of effort implemented by the politician changes as
level of competition changes.
Case I: Pure re-election concerns, inability to use dynamic incentives
In this case, the politician can only use static contracts each period. This means β(φ) = 0
and e∗1 = αR(φ)
2
7 r
4
7 . As the level of competition increases, the marginal return to politi-
cians from extra effort put into the project by the bureaucrat increases. This is because in
competitive districts, the value of increase from a small vote share is much higher than in
stronghold constituencies. Thus, re-election concerns suggest Rφ > 0. Differentiating the
optimal effort level with respect to φ gives us:
de∗1
dφ
= 27αR
−5
7 r
4
7Rφ > 0 (1.14)
This suggests as the level of competition increases, re-election concerns put pressure on
the politician to induce a higher effort level form the bureaucrat. Now, starting from the
optimal level of effort, what happens if the probability of winning goes to zero? Since the
probability of winning being zero means lack of re-election concerns similar to that of low
φ, 1.14 tells us that the optimal effort level should fall.
Case II: Ability to use dynamic incentives, no re-election concerns
This case corresponds to R(φ) = R. Now, whether the politician is able to use the promise
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of future payoffs to induce effort depends on β(φ). With high electoral competition,
β(φ) ≈ 0 such that these politicians can only provide static contracts in each period.
This reduces the first period effort level to ecomptt1 = αR
2
7 r
4
7 . Dividing this expression with
the expression for the effort level that can be implemented by the recursive contract by
politicians in strongholds, we get:
ecomptt1
estronghold1
= r
4
7
(r + βV ) 47
< 1 ⇒ ecomptt1 < estronghold1
This shows that as level of competition rises, politician’s ability to use the long-term con-
tracts falls since the probability of them getting re-elected is low. This affects the optimal
effort level that can be implemented. Now, what happens if the probability of winning
falls to zero? In this case, both re-election concerns and dynamic incentives are shut down
(β(0) = 0 and R(0)) ⇒ e∗1 → 0. Thus, starting from any effort level, exogenous decrease
in winning probability should reduce optimal effort level.
We can summarize the theoretical predictions in the following table:
Table 1.1: Predictions for the Potential Mechanisms
Mechanism δeδφ ∆e as Prob(win) → 0
1 Re-election Concerns (+) (-)
2 Access to Dynamic Contracts (-) (-)
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Now, how do we interpret the two columns of table 1.1? The first thing to note is that
extent of electoral competition is non-monotonic in the probability of winning as shown in
the figure below. When the probability of winning is close to zero, the politician does not
face any re-election concerns. Moreover, he does not have access to dynamic contracts. On
the other hand, when the probability of winning is close to one, the politicians can credibly
make future promises to bureaucrats. However, the re-election concerns are weak at this
end of the spectrum as well. Now, when the probability of winning is close to half, the
pressure of electoral competition is the highest.12
The predictions in table 1.1 look at what the mechanisms have to say about change in op-
timal level of effort when we move away from probability of winning at half. Predictions in
column (1) tell us how the level of effort changes when the probability of winning increases
towards one. In column (2) however, we are looking at what the mechanisms have to say
when we move away from half towards probability of winning being zero. Carrying out
both the exercises can help us identify which of the mechanisms is dominant.
12Strictly speaking, the probability of winning is half if there is a contest between two candidates. In
India, there is a multi party system. However, in many cases there are two strong players and several
smaller ones. Even if there are three strong players, for the incumbent, what matters is how far he is from
the next best candidate.
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Data Sources
The main source of data on local public goods comes from the MPLAD database. We have
data for each project that was recommended and sanctioned across all 392 constituencies
in 12 major states in India over the period 1999-2009. These cover 72% of all constituencies
in India and two Lok Sabha election terms: 1999-2004 and 2004-2009. 13 The details of
the projects available to us include the type of the project (whether its a road project,
drinking water project etc.); the cost incurred; the location; the day on which the project
was recommended and the day on which it was sanctioned by the collector. For a subset
of projects, we also know the time lag between the day the project was sanctioned and
the day on which the project actually got completed. We also know which implementing
agency executed the project.
In the MPLAD data, even though we know which village the project was recommended
in, we do not know the identity of the administrative district the village belongs to. We
only know which constituency it belongs to. Knowing the identity of the districts is im-
portant for us to know which bureaucrat interacted with which politician. In order to
find out which district the project was implemented in, we match village and block names
from the MPLAD database to the village names in Census data. Our first iteration used a
string matching algorithm and in cases where we did not find unique matches, we manually
matched the village names.
Once we matched the village names across MPLAD data and Census data, it provided
13These 12 major states are: Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Maha-
rashtra, Gujarat, Kerala, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Chhattisgarh and Assam.
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us with both district and constituency names for each village. In order to test whether
the matching algorithm gave us correct matching, we use shape file data for villages from
Census of India and shape files for constituency boundaries obtained from the Election
Commission of India. Shape files contain the information on the boundaries of districts,
constituencies, and villages. The observations appear as points on polygons. Points are
the GPS coordinates and the polygons they form are the boundaries of the geographical
unit under study. The following steps are followed in mapping projects from MPLAD
data to districts: for each village, we find the centroid using the ArcGIS. We then take
the centroid and figure out which polygon it belongs to in the district shape files and
which polygon it belongs to in the electoral constituency shape files. This provides us with
district-constituency pairs for each project. Using geospatial overlaps, we also obtain the
extent to which the administrative and electoral boundaries overlap.
Once we obtain the district name for each project in the MPLAD database, we then iden-
tify which bureaucrat served as the collector in that particular district in that particular
month and year. This allows us to see the identity of the bureaucrat who approved each
project.
The information on bureaucrats is obtained from the Department of Personnel and Training
(DoPT) in India. The DoPT keeps the records of all IAS officers in the form of Executive
Record sheets. There is one ER sheet per bureaucrat. This provides us with information
about their name, their cadre, their educational background as well as all assignments since
the day they joined the civil services. We digitized these ERs in the form of a database and
used it to figure out which bureaucrat was assigned as collector to which district over the
1999-2009 period. In any given district, over a ten year period, on average, we can expect
five to six bureaucrats to serve as collectors. So, knowing just the district is not enough.
We need to know exactly which bureaucrat served in any given month. Only then can we
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know which bureaucrat sanctioned which project. This piece of information is essential for
our identification strategy.
The election data is obtained from the Election Commission of India. We obtain data for
all parliamentary elections from 1989-2009. The main variable of interest is the extent of
political competition. We look at various measures of competition. The first one is victory
margin which uses information on vote shares of the winner and runner up. The second
measure is whether a constituency is a party stronghold or not. This measure looks at
identity of the party that won previous consecutive elections.
This data also provides us with the names of the winning candidates and their party affilia-
tion. We can map the names across different electoral terms to see whether these politicians
are rookies or have been serving for a long time. This allows us to control for politician’s
experiences. We also use the party information to see if the MPs are from the same party
as the party in power at the center. This proxies for political connection of the politicians.
1.4.2 Measuring Bureaucrat’s Performance
The objective of this chapter is to examine how bureaucrats’ performance is affected by
electoral competition. For this exercise, we need to define a task assigned to bureaucrats
and compare how they perform this task. In this chapter we propose a new way of measur-
ing bureaucratic performance: time taken to approve development projects. This is equal
to the number of days between the date on which the politician recommended the project
and the date on which the bureaucrat gave his stamp of approval. The main advantage of
this measure is that this task is purely under the control of the bureaucrat: any delays in
approval can be directly attributed to him.
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Alternative measures used in the literature are time taken to complete projects (i.e. time
taken for construction to complete) and completion rates (i.e. proportion of projects that
got completed)14. While these measures are a good indicator of overall governance, we
cannot use these to identify which bureaucrat is at fault if delays occur. Completing a
project involves several individuals and in infrastructure projects, unobserved factors like
the weather can be important reasons for delays. Since the execution process is more com-
plex and has many more unobservables compared to the sanctioning time, we prefer to
use the later measure. If approvals take a long time, then we know that it is because the
bureaucrat is not putting the effort to get things done. Being able to directly observe the
actions of the bureaucrat gives us an advantage over other measures.
Given that our measure is directly related to the decisions of a single individual, it is com-
forting to know that it is positively correlated to completion times. For a very small subset
of projects in our database, we have information on the date at which the project construc-
tion began and the date at which the project construction ended. We use this additional
information to construct a measure of delay in completion - this is the time between the
date of sanctioning by the bureaucrat and the date at which the project construction was
completed. Note that this measure of delay does not include time taken to sanction - it
only looks at how long a project took to complete after it was sanctioned.
Table 1.3 explores the relationship between time taken to sanction projects and time taken
to complete projects. As we can see, there is a significant positive correlation between
commencement and sanctioning time. This suggests that if bureaucrats perform better ac-
cording to our measure, then then the projects get started faster. In column 2, we see that
14See Roggers (2014)
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if bureaucrat gets project sanctioned within 10 days, then the the delay in commencement
of projects reduces by more than 3 months. This is a very large magnitude. Moreover, if
projects take more than 90 days to sanction, the then the project construction is delayed
by about 7 months. Hence, the speed of sanctioning and speed of project construction
move in the same direction15.
1.5 Empirical Identification Strategy
Consider the following model:
y = µ0 + µ1 ∗ Competition+  (1.15)
where y denotes the time taken to sanction a project. We are interested in establishing
the causal effect of competition on time taken to sanction the project. Identifying the
parameter µ1 requires two things: [1] there should be no reverse causality and [2] there
should not be any other unobservables that affects our measure of competition.
In the literature, lagged victory margins are often used as measures of competition. This
measure assumes that past victory margins are a good predictor of the future victory mar-
gins. Moreover, any deviations between the past and future victory margins are assumed
to be random and independent to the outcome variable of interest. Now, in our setup, this
assumption is violated if we believe that the bureaucrat’s performance between the two
elections can affect the future victory margin. Moreover, Ravishankar (2009) shows that
15Although time taken to sanction projects is a more direct way of measuring bureaucratic performance,
it would be nice to replicate the tables with an additional measure. However, we have very little data on
time taken to complete the projects, hence cannot carry out such an analysis.
26
there is a strong anti-incumbency effect in Indian elections. Hence, past victory margins
may not fully capture the re-election concerns faced by the incumbent.
1.5.1 Obtaining Exogenous Variation in Probability of Winning
In order to obtain the causal effect of electoral competition on bureaucrats’ performance,
we need to have a truly exogenous source of variation in political competition. To get such
a variation, we take advantage of an information shock that occurred in the middle of the
2004-2009 legislative term. This shock exogenously changed some incumbents’ perceived
probability of winning in the next elections to zero while not affecting other incumbents.
Henceforth, we refer to the constituencies that are affected by the shock as the treated
group while those that are not affected by this shock are the control group. We can then
compare the sanctioning times of the treated and control groups before and after this shock.
Since this event essentially causes an exogenous change in the electoral competition, the
differences-in-difference strategy will give us a causal effect of change in political competi-
tion on the performance of the bureaucrat.
The information shock we take advantage of is an outcome of the redistricting process that
took place in India from 2002-2007. The Government of India froze the changing of elec-
toral boundaries in 1976 and the freeze was supposed to be lifted after the 2001 census was
carried out. A delimitation commission was set up in 2002 with the objective of redrawing
the electoral boundaries such that the population shares across constituencies are equal-
ized. The total number of constituencies were to remain unchanged. In addition to the
equalization of population, the commission re-demarcated the SC/ST constituencies. The
SC/ST constituencies are ‘reserved’ in the sense that only candidates who belong to the
Scheduled Caste (SC) or Scheduled Tribe (ST) are allowed to contest. Those constituencies
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that are not reserved, allows any citizen to contest as a candidate.
Article 330 of the Constitution of India says that the number of constituencies (or ‘seats’)
reserved in any state should be proportional to the number of total seats within a state.
Which seat is reserved depends on the relative population of SC/ST across constituen-
cies. So, when the constituency borders are being redrawn, the politicians cannot predict
whether their own constituency will be reserved or not because the reservation status de-
pends on how boundaries of other constituencies were re-drawn. This fact is important
for the identification strategy. This is because politicians may attempt to influence the re-
districting process in order to benefit from it. If the influence in re-districting is a function
of political competition, then the concern is that this event may not be truly exogenous.
But, since there is no threshold rule but reservation is based on relative population shares,
the announcement of the reservation status acts as an exogenous information shock to the
incumbents, even if the redistricting may have been endogenous. 16
The report of the delimitation commission of 2002 came in December 2007. This informa-
tion shock is in the middle of the term 2004-2009. Figure 2.1 depicts the timing of the
announcement. It shows that conditions for using difference-in-difference (DID) strategy
are ripe. We now need to do the following: [1] clearly define the treatment group and [2]
show how this exogenous information shock changed the perceived probability of winning
for the treated group.
A constituency can be of three types: [1] reserved for only candidates who belong to SC
category, [2] reserved for ST category candidates and [3] GEN (General) category where
16A paper by Iyer and Reddy (2013) provides further support for our identification strategy. They study
the redistricting process in India and find that "the redistricting process does not appear to have been
influenced by incumbent politicians to a great extent."
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any citizen can contest (including SC/ST candidates). Under 1972 delimitation, certain
constituencies were reserved for SC or ST categories. The incumbents who took office in
May 2004 were elected according to the reservation scheme as under 1972 directives. In
2007, the incumbents got to know the reservation status of their constituency for the 2009
election. All those constituencies where there was no change in the reservation status - are
in the control group. The electoral districts where there were changes in the reservation
status can be classified into two types of treatment groups: [1] REStoGEN - where the con-
stituency was reserved under the 1972 delimitation but all types of candidates were allowed
to contest under the 2002 delimitation. [2] GENtoRES - in this case the constituencies
were open to all before and in 2007 it was announced that they will be reserved only for
SC/ST candidates from 2009 elections.
For incumbents who don’t belong to the SC/ST category in the GENtoRES constituencies
(which is 87% of all candidates), the change in the reservation status means that they
will not be allowed to contest again. Hence, their probability of winning in 2009 is de-
terministically zero. For the incumbents in REStoGEN, the probability of winning is not
conceptually zero because they are, in principle, allowed to contest again. However, as we
will show now, the perceived probability of winning for these incumbents would have been
very close to zero.
In table 1.4, consider the group "Gen to Gen." There are 342 constituencies where all can-
didates could contest in 2004 as well as in 2009 elections. This group is a subset of the
control group. Column (2) shows that out of all contestants in these constituencies, only
16% were SC/ST candidates. This means out of 4,477 candidates in these constituencies,
only 716 were from reserved category. All these constituencies had at least one candidate
who was from reserved category. Column (4) shows that out of these 342 constituencies,
only 6 constituency had a winner who came from the reserved category. So, less than 2%
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of the constituencies open to all had a SC/ST leader.
What do these statistics tell us? Consider an incumbent in the REStoGEN treatment
group. In the middle of the term, he gets to know that the constituency he represents will
be open to competition from other general category candidates. These are career politi-
cians that have a fair amount of idea about what the chances of an SC/ST candidates are
in winning an election in GEN category constituency. The above calculations tell us that in
2004, the only 2% of the reserved candidates are successful in winning a seat - this is a fairly
low number. Hence, the increase in competition from general candidates is likely to take
the perceived probability of winning for incumbents in REStoGEN category is close to zero.
Moreover, there is another source of competition faced by these incumbents: intra-party
competition. An incumbent of party A may be getting the party ticket to contest in the
reserved category constituencies because he may be the best SC/ST candidate. But when
the constituency gets de-reserved, this incumbent is up against the general category candi-
dates to get the party ticket to contest in the first place. There are two facts that confirm
this: [1] None of the incumbents in the REStoGEN treatment group got a ticket to contest
again in 2009 and [2] ALL 2009 candidates in REStoGEN group belonged to the GEN
category - none of the candidates were from SC/ST category!
Hence once the information shock came in 2007, it is reasonable to assume that due to in-
crease in both intra-party competition and competition from other contestants, the SC/ST
incumbents’ perceived probability of winning in 2009 jumped very close to zero within the
REStoGEN.
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1.5.2 Isolating the Mechanisms
While the natural experiment described above helps us determine the causal effect of
competition on bureaucratic performance, it does not tell us which mechanism drives the
results. This is because when the probability of winning goes to zero, both re-election
concerns as well as access to dynamic contracts shut down. In order to see what hap-
pens when probability of winning goes to one, we use an alternative measure of extent
of electoral pressures: whether a constituency is a party stronghold or not. We define
stronghold as a dummy variable that takes value one if the same party won over all four
elections between 1989-1998. Table 1.5 shows that the probability of a stronghold party
winning again in 1999 is 65% and winning in 2004 is about 70%. These probabilities are
significantly higher compared to non-stronghold constituencies. Note that by construction,
our measure of stronghold compares those constituencies where parties have survived the
anti-incumbency effect in the past with ones that did not survive it. Hence, the incumbents
of stronghold constituencies face less electoral pressures compared to the non-strongholds.
Now, how long bureaucrats take to sanction projects depends on their ability. If higher
ability bureaucrats are assigned to strongholds, then the error term is correlated to the
main regressor of interest. This gives rise to the following selection problem: if we observe
a negative relationship between our competition measure and time taken to sanction, it
could very well be driven by bureaucrat’s ability. To solve this problem, we exploit two
features of our data: [a] panel structure and [b] boundary overlaps. The latter refers to the
fact that the administrative and electoral boundaries do not perfectly overlap in India. A
single district may have two or three Lok Sabha constituencies that overlap with it. Since
the collector is the head bureaucrat in a district and the politician is the elected represen-
tative of the electoral constituencies, we have situations where one bureaucrat may deal
with two or even three politicians.
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Figure 1.2 illustrates such a possibility of overlaps. In this example, the district overlaps
with three constituencies: 1, 2, and 3. Each of these politicians face different levels of
political competition in their constituencies. However, all three politicians have to depend
on this bureaucrat for execution of projects within the district boundary depicted in black
color. We can compare the average time taken by this bureaucrat for each of the three
politicians. Since we keep the bureaucrat fixed, this controls for the unobserved ability. If
we observe that the bureaucrat sanctions projects faster for the politician in the stronghold,
then we can attribute the difference in performance to the difference in level of competition.
Our discussion so far provides us with two models that we can use to isolate the mechanism
that drives the relationship between political competition on bureaucratic performance:
yibpc = β0 + β1 ∗ Party_Strongholdc + ibpc (1.16)
yibpc = γ0 +γ1 ∗ (Prob(win) = 0)c ∗Post+γ2 ∗ (Prob(win) = 0)c+γ3 ∗Post+ ibpc (1.17)
where, yibpc denotes the time taken to sanction project i by bureaucrat b when paired with
politician p in constituency c. The variable stronghold means that the same party had won
all four elections prior to 1999 elections.
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Now, how do we interpret β1 and γ1? When the party of an incumbent has a stronghold
over the constituency then it means that the probability he will win again is very high
(close to 1). Hence, we can think of β1 as the effect on approval speed as probability of
winning goes to 1. On the other hand, our exogenous shock works as a term limit on the
incumbents. Therefore, γ1 looks at the effect on bureaucrat’s performance as the proba-
bility of winning goes to zero.
As discussed under the theoretical framework, different mechanisms predict different signs
on β1 and γ1. The following table provides the predictions of the alternative channels:
Table 1.2: Predictions for the Potential Mechanisms
Mechanism β γ
1 Re-election Concerns (+) (+)
2 Access to Dynamic Contracts (-) (+)
Note that our measure of bureaucratic performance is time taken to sanction a project
which can be thought of as negative of e in the model. Hence, in column 2 of table 2, the
signs are flipped compared to table 1, column 2. Moreover, since stronghold is negatively
correlated to φ (the extent of competition), the signs in column 1 are the same in both
tables.
1.6 Empirical Results
We begin by providing the OLS estimates for the effect of electoral competition on time
taken to sanction the projects when the measure of competition is victory margin in the
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previous election. Table 1.6 gives the results of this specification. Column 1 shows that
as margin of victory increases by 1%, the time taken to sanction the projects reduces by
about a day. Now, the 10th percentile victory margin distribution is at 1.8% while the
90th percentile is at 22.6%. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that moving from
one end of the distribution to the other, a fall in electoral competition reduces the number
of days to sanction by about 16 days 17. Hence, bureaucrats perform better when electoral
competition is low.
As we discussed before, past victory margin may not be a good predictor the extent of
competition faced by the politician in the next election. Moreover, there are concerns
about reverse causality when one uses this measure. We now present the results from
the difference-in-difference specification. It provides us with the causal effect of change in
politician’s probability of winning on bureaucrats’ performance.
1.6.1 Results from Difference-in-Differences Strategy
Consider the following model:
yibpct = γ0 + γ1 ∗ Treatmentc ∗ Post+ γ2 ∗ Treatmentc + γ3 ∗ Post (1.18)
+ pip + φb + τt + ψ + ibpct
17Assuming a linear relationship between victory margin and time taken to sanction.
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where, yibpct denotes the time taken to sanction project i by bureaucrat b when paired with
politician p in constituency c in year t. pip, φb, τt and ψ are fixed effects as defined before.
The variable ‘Treatment’ takes value one if the announcement of delimitation affected the
particular constituency while ‘post’ is a dummy variable denoting the period after the de-
limitation (2008-2009).
Table 1.7 gives the results for specification 1.18. The difference-in-differences estimate γ1
is positive and statistically significant at 10% l.o.s. It shows that as the probability of
winning goes to zero, the average time taken to sanction a project increase by about 10
days. Given that the mean of the dependent variable is 73 days, it means that sanctioning
time increases by approximately13%. In column 2, we use the cost of project as a measure
of the size of project. The results remain unchanged.
1.6.2 Falsification Tests for DID Strategy
One key assumption of DID estimation is that the trends in outcomes of interest would
be the same in both the groups in absence of the shock, and it is the new information
that induced a deviation from the common trend. One way to check this is to compare
the trends before the shock took place. This can be carried out formally by creating a
fake shock prior to the actual shock and estimating model with the same treatment and
control groups. If pre-trends in time taken to sanction are the same, then the difference-
in-differences estimates with the ‘fake’ shock should be zero.
We create such a fake shock occurring in December of 2005, two years prior to the actual
shock. The treated and control groups remain the same. Table 1.8 provides the results of
this specification. As we can see, the magnitudes of the difference-in-differences estimator
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has gone down substantially. Moreover, the coefficient is insignificant. This is comforting
and suggests that we can assume that pre-shock trends in times taken to sanction were
same across the control and treated groups.
1.6.3 Isolating the Mechanisms
While the DID estimate provides us with the causal effect of politician’s probability of win-
ning on bureaucrats’ performance, it does not by itself help identify the causal mechanism.
As discussed before, this is because when the shock occurs, both re-election concerns as
well as access to dynamic incentives shut down. In order to identify which mechanism is
driving the results, we now estimate the following model:
yibpct = β0 + β1 ∗ Strongholdc + pip + φb + τt + ψ + ibpct (1.19)
where stronghold is a dummy variable that takes value one if the same party won over all
four elections between 1989-1999. pip and φb are politician and bureaucratic effects respec-
tively. τt corresponds to year fixed effects and ψ denotes project type fixed effects.
Column (1) of Table 1.9 provides the estimates of equation 1.19. The average time taken
to sanction a project is significantly lower by a magnitude of about nine days if a con-
stituency is a party stronghold compared to when its not. Comparing this to the mean of
the dependent variable, we find that this constitutes about an 11% decrease in approval
speed. In column 2, we add the size of the project which is meant to capture how big the
project is. Column (3) controls for politicians experience and shows that more experienced
the politician is, the faster the projects are sanctioned. This does not change the effect of
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being a stronghold on the speed of approval. Column (4) controls for whether the incum-
bent is from the same party as the leader of the state and (5) includes party fixed effects.
The results remain the same: when competitive pressures are very low, the projects are
sanctioned significantly faster.
What does this tell us about the potential mechanisms? From table 1.2 we see - that we
can reject the hypothesis that pure re-election concernsdrive the results. The results are
consistent with dynamic incentive mechanism: when the probability of winning is high,
the politicians can credibly use dynamic contracts to incentivize the bureaucrat. In com-
petitive areas, on the other hand, promise of future rewards are less credible.
1.6.4 Promotions: Direct Evidence for Dynamic Incenitives
Until now we have been talking about future rewards without saying what they actually
are. In this section we explore the nature of incentives provided to the bureaucrats. Since
the bureaucrats we look at are career civil servants, their wages are determined exoge-
nously. The only way the politician can control the bureaucrat is by reassignment to other
districts or a plum job at the time of promotion. We now show that it is the promise of
favorably affecting the promotions that induces bureaucrats to perform better.
Using the career histories, we construct a promotion timeline for the bureaucrats. As we
mentioned before, we look at bureaucrats when they are collectors because this is the pe-
riod in which they are responsible for approving and executing the public goods. This
corresponds to roughly years 5-16 of their careers. In their 9th year, they are promoted
to the next level but there is no screening: everyone is promoted 18. This is basically a
18See http://persmin.gov.in/DOPT/EmployeesCorner/Acts_Rules/IASPromotionGuideLines.pdf
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hike in their salaries. It is in the 13th and the 16th years that the promotions have a bite.
The politicians can potentially influence bureaucrats’ job assignments once they are up for
these promotion.
We construct a variable that measures how far the bureaucrats are away from the pro-
motions. For this exercise, we only consider bureaucrats who are in years 10-16 years of
their career since the 9th year promotion is “non-functional”. The variable “three years to
promotion” means they are either in the 10th year of their career or just crossed 13th year.
Two years and one year from promotion are defined similarly.
Our first hypothesis is that when bureaucrats are up for promotion, the performance should
improve. Table 1.10 looks at effect of distance from promotion screening on approval times.
Column (1) shows that compared to three or more years, the time taken to sanction is about
14 days less when the bureaucrat is up for promotion within the year. This magnitude
is 20% of the mean of dependent variable. This result remains robust to controlling for
project characteristics.
To see how the promotions tie up with the dynamic incentives, we now perform an empir-
ical test. Suppose we are in time t = 0 and elections are to be held in period t = 2. Let
B1 denote a bureaucrat who is up for promotion in t = 1, i.e. before the elections. Let B2
denote a bureaucrat who is up for promotion in t > 2. How should B1 and B2 perform?
The answer rests in whether we are in a stronghold (S) or a non-stronghold (N).
Let us first consider the B1 bureaucrats. These bureaucrats are going to be up for pro-
motion before the next elections. This means that both the stronghold as well as non-
stronghold politicians will be in office at the time of promotion. If favorable promotions
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are what the bureaucrats care about, then we should not see any difference in the time
taken to approve for B1 bureaucrats across strongholds and non-strongholds.
Now, let us consider B2 bureaucrats who would be up for promotion after the elections.
The politicians in strongholds are likely to be re-elected and hence would be able to affect
the reassignment of the bureaucrats. On the other hand, politicians in non-strongholds are
less likely to be in office in the next term and hence have a lesser ability to influence their
bureaucrat’s promotions. We should therefore find that B2 bureaucrats perform better for
stronghold politicians.
Table 1.11 presents the results of this exercise. The base category consists of bureaucrats
who are up for promotion within a year in non-strongholds. The first row in panel A shows
that the time taken to approve for B1 bureaucrats in strongholds is the same as time taken
for B1 bureaucrats in non-strongholds. If we compare the time taken for B2 bureaucrats
across these constituencies, we find that time taken to approve is about 14 days less in
strongholds. This is 19% of the mean dependent variable. Panel B provides the p-value for
this difference. These results provide direct evidence for dynamic incentives: there is no
difference in performance when both stronghold and non-stronghold politicians are likely
to in office at time of promotion screeinging (before next elections). However, there is a
significant difference in performance when one type of politician is likely to be in office to
influence promotions and the other type of politician is not likely to be in office.
An important point to note is that in addition to providing direct evidence for dynamic
incentives, these results also help eliminate other alternative explanations for why, on an
average, the projects are approved faster in strongholds. For example, one might expect
politicians in strongholds to be of higher ability. That could mean that these politician
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monitor the bureaucrat more that the non-stronghold politicians and therefore we see better
performance in strongholds. However, potential difference in politician ability cannot ex-
plain the promotion results. The only explanation that is consistent with promotion results
is that politician’s ability to provide incentives to bureaucrat matters for their performance.
1.6.5 Diluted Incentives: Role of Number of Bureaucrats per Politician
As we mentioned before, the administrative boundaries do not perfectly overlap with the
electoral boundaries. This creates a situation where at any given time, one bureaucrat
can be working with multiple bureaucrats. In our dataset, there are 386 constituencies
and 694 district-constituency pairs. Out of the 386 constituencies, 136 overlap with two
districts and 80 constituencies overlap with three or more districts. The rest have only one
bureaucrat per politician.
We interact the stronghold dummy with number of bureaucrats per politician. The hy-
pothesis is that the more the number of bureaucrats, the worse the performance should
be. To see why this is so, let us go back to our main mechanism. The politicians use
current and future rewards to incentivize bureaucrats to put in higher effort levels. We
can think of the number of rewards as being fixed. This is a valid assumption in our insti-
tutional setup since the contracts are implicit in nature are based on relationship between
the politician and bureaucrats. These relational contracts require repeated interactions be-
tween the politicians and bureaucrats. When there are multiple bureaucrats per politician,
it becomes costlier for the politician to implement a high effort level from all bureaucrats.
In such a case, since the rewards per bureaucrat reduces, the incentives of bureaucrat to
perform get diluted. Hence, we should see that projects take longer to get approved as the
number of bureaucrats increase.
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We now estimate the following model:
yibpct = θ0 + θ1 ∗ Strongholdc +
3∑
j=2
θj ∗ Strongholdc ∗ jBureaucratsc + ibpct (1.20)
where j refers to the number of bureaucrats. The hypothesis is that θ1 < 0 and θ1 < θ2 <
θ3.
Table 1.12 presents the results of the above specification. As we can see, when there is
one bureaucrat per politician, the projects are sanctioned 15 days faster in strongholds
than non-strongholds. However, when we compare the performance of bureaucrats in
strongholds with one bureaucrat per politician with strongholds with multiple bureau-
crats, the performance is worse when there are multiple bureaucrats. This is especially
true when there are three or more bureaucrats. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that θ1 < θ2 < θ3.
1.6.6 Speed of Approvals and Project Types
Our results show that politicians in strongholds are able to get the bureaucrats to speed
up the sanctioning of projects. A valid concern is that politicians in low competition areas
may be systematically choosing to implement their pet projects faster. In this section we
show that there is no ‘project bias’.
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Before we proceed to look at specific project types, we first address the question of what
the optimal time taken to sanction a project should be. The recommendation of Ministry
of Statistics and Programme Implementation is that the decision to approve the project
must be completed within 45 days. This threshold is supposed to be an upper bound to
how long sanctions can take and is applicable to all types of projects.
In order to get a better understanding of the implementation process, we visited 17 dis-
tricts in India. In each district, we talked to the district magistrate, the director of the
development authority and four engineers. Engineers were asked the exact steps that are
involved in the sanctioning process and how many days it generally takes. Based on the
interviews, we find that the sanctioning process entails the following steps:
Step 1: Politician sends project recommendation to bureaucrat.
Step 2: Bureaucrat chooses implementing agency and sends proposal to chief engi-
neer.
Step 3: Chief engineer assigns a junior engineer to go and inspect the site.
Step 4: Junior engineer inspects and submits a feasibility report.
Step 5: Chief engineer prepares budget estimate and technical feasibility report and
sends it back to bureaucrat.
Step 6: Bureaucrat reviews structural and financial feasibility and approves the
projects.
The bureaucrat (district magistrate) monitors the entire process of sanctioning. She can
ask for a status update on whether project sites have been visited, whether the feasibility
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report has been submitted, etc. If the engineers are delaying the process and the bureau-
crat does not keep tabs on the procedures, then administrative sanctions get delayed as
well. Once the initial engineering reports are submitted, how long the bureaucrat takes to
review the proposal is entirely in her control.
According to the engineer’s responses, all the above steps can be followed within approxi-
mately 30 days.19 Hence, the median upper bound from the engineer’s responses is 15 days
lower than the official guideline of 45 days. These benchmarks suggest that projects that
are sanctioned above 45 days are delays.
We now examine how being a stronghold affects the probability that projects are delayed.
Column (1) of Table 1.13 looks at the probability of a project being sanctioned within 30
days. As we can see, the probability is 7% higher for stronghold constituencies. Moreover,
column (3) shows that probability that the projects take more than 45 days to sanction is
5% less in stronghold. There is no difference between strongholds and non-strongholds in
the probability of a project being sanctioned between 30-45 days. All specifications control
for project type. These results suggest that the distribution of time taken to sanction
shifts to the left for strongholds: the probability of delays is significantly lower and the
probability of sanctioning projects within 30 days is also significantly higher.
Table 1.14 looks at these probabilities across project types. Panel [A] shows that the prob-
ability of the projects being sanctioned within 30 days in strongholds is significantly higher
for road, water, and irrigation as well as health projects. Also, from panel [C], we can see
that these projects are less likely to take more than 45 days to be approved. These results
show that all types of projects are approved faster in strongholds.
19The median number of days for the entire sanctioning process as reported by the engineers is 30 days
while the average is 38 days.
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1.7 Concluding Remarks
In the existing empirical literature, politician-bureaucrat interactions have mostly been
analyzed with respect to re-election concerns. This chapter examines a hitherto unex-
plored mechanism that connects electoral competition to bureaucratic performance: access
to dynamic contracts. Using a richly constructed data from India and developing a novel
empirical methodology to isolate these mechanisms, we show that politicians in low compe-
tition constituencies can get bureaucrats to perform better by using long-term contracts.
We also show that the future rewards used to incentivize bureaucrats take the form of
promotions.
While this chapter focused on the variations within bureaucrat performance, an equally
important issue is the selection of bureaucrats itself: how does electoral competition af-
fect allocation of bureaucrats across different politicians? Although, in India, the initial
appointment of bureaucrats to various posts and districts is done by an independent orga-
nization headed by the top bureaucrats within a state, politicians can influence the career
paths of individual bureaucrats. The results of this chapter suggest that bureaucrats re-
spond to politician’s incentives when they are up for promotion. Moreover, Iyer and Mani
(2012) show that when there is political turnover, the probability of bureaucratic turnover
increases significantly. These two results suggest that politicians can influence the process
of bureaucrats’ appointments. I study this issue in a parallel work-in-progress.
With respect to the role of electoral competition in public goods provision, this chapter
focused on the implementation problem. An equally important issue is how electoral pres-
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sures affect the allocation of public goods. In the second chapter, I examine this allocation
problem. Using household survey data from India, I first analyze how stated preferences
vary across wealth classes. Then I use the dataset on MPLAD local public goods to show
that in absence of re-election concerns, politicians are most likely to spend on projects that
are desired by the rich.
These results contribute not only to our understanding of how politician-bureaucrat inter-
actions affect policy implementation, but also to the role of political competition. On one
hand, it is argued that in autocracies, the politicians are able to get things done because
of centralized power, while in democracies - there are too many political constraints which
slows thing down. On the other hand, it is argued that democracies are more redistribu-
tive. The results of this chapter taken together with insights from chapter 2 highlight this
tradeoff: democratic pressures lead to higher redistribution but also more delays in service
delivery.
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Figure 1.1: Electoral Constituency Boundaries and Victory Margins for 1999 Elections
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of a Possible District-Constituency Overlap
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Figure 1.3: Outline of the Difference-in-Differences Strategy
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Table 1.3: Correlation Between Time Taken to Sanction and Delay in Project Implemen-
tation
.
(1) (2) (3)
Execution Time Execution Time Execution Time
Number of Days to Sanction 1.49***
(0.44)
Sanctioned within 10 Days -161.43*
(87.13)
Sanctioned greater than 90 days 220.86***
(42.09)
Cost Sanctioned for the project 9.77*** 12.77** 13.42**
(3.09) (6.21) (5.57)
Constant -448.98 374.70** 398.13***
(352.31) (168.99) (22.03)
Observations 426 426 426
Adjusted R2 0.777 0.749 0.753
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Constituency Fixed Effects YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at Constituency level.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics for Change in Perceived Probability of Winning
Number of Average Proportion Number of
Constituencies of Candidates Constituencies
belonging to with
SC/ST Category SC/ST Winners
Group 2004 2009 2004 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Res to Gen 37 100 17.6 37 0
- (14.22)
Gen to Res 52 24.76 100 7 52
(27.04) -
Gen to Gen 444 31.17 29.5 80 78
/ Res to Res (34.74) (34.77)
Gen to Gen 342 16.45 14.04 6 3
(15.23) (11.92)
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Table 1.5: Stronghold- Predicting Probability of Same Party Winning Again
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Won 1999 Won 2004 Won 1999 Won 2004
Stronghold 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.18* 0.29**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant 0.47*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 0.39***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 374 374 374 374
R2 0.021 0.058 0.021 0.058
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level in (3) and (4).
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Table 1.6: Effect of Competition on Time taken to Sanction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Time Taken to Sanction Projects
Victory Margin -0.75** -0.74** -0.77** -0.75** -0.58*
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.35)
Cost of Project 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.11
(0.47) (0.44) (0.44) (0.27)
Observations 220360 220358 220358 220358 220358
R2 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.027 0.262
Mean Dependent Variable 78.63 78.63 78.63 78.63 78.63
Project Type Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES
Constituency Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency-term level.
Dependent variable is time taken by the bureaucrat to complete projects in a district-constituency.
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Table 1.7: Results of Difference-in-Differences Strategy
Dependent Variable: Time Taken to Approve
(1) (2)
Treated*Post 10.78** 10.69**
(4.24) (4.15)
Post 2007 -32.27*** -21.24***
(6.43) (3.64)
Cost of Project 0.80**
(0.35)
Observations 30007 30006
R2 0.353 0.354
Mean Dependent Variable 73.18 73.18
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES
Politician Fixed Effects YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
Project Fixed Effects YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level.
Dependent variable is time taken by the bureaucrat to complete a project.
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Table 1.8: DID Falsification Test - Fake Shock
Dependent Variable: Time Taken to Approve
(1) (2)
Treated*Post 2005 2.31 2.31
(14.71) (14.71)
Post 2005 14.76** 14.75**
(6.12) (6.12)
Cost of Project 0.14
(0.44)
Observations 37048 37047
R2 0.342 0.342
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES
Politician Fixed Effects YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
Project Fixed Effects YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level.
Dependent variable is time taken by the bureaucrat to complete a project.
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Table 1.9: Effect of Competition on Time taken to Sanction
Dependent Variable: Time Taken to Sanction Projects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stronghold -8.84* -8.78* -8.70* -8.76* -11.31**
(4.82) (4.81) (4.54) (4.87) (5.11)
Cost of Project -0.61**
(0.31)
Politician Experience -0.06
(0.48)
Winner from CM Party 1.83
(4.85)
Observations 165276 165274 165276 165276 165276
R2 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.337
Mean Dependent Variable 76.98 76.98 76.98 76.98 76.98
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Project Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency-term level.
Dependent variable is time taken by the bureaucrat to complete projects in a district-constituency.
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Table 1.10: Promotion Timeline and Bureaucratic Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One Year to Promotion -13.42*** -13.41*** -13.45*** -14.46***
(4.71) (4.72) (4.73) (4.81)
Cost of Project -0.29
(0.35)
Number of Projects -0.02
(0.03)
Total Uptake 0.00**
(0.00)
Observations 32306 32306 32306 32306
R2 0.648 0.648 0.648 0.649
Mean Dependent Variable 69.03 69.03 69.03 69.03
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Project Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Politician Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency-term level.
Dependent variable is time taken by the bureaucrat to complete projects in a district-constituency.
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Table 1.11: Bureaucratic Performance Two Years Before Elections
PANEL A: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Time Taken to Approve
(1) (2) (3)
One Year* Stronghold 3.26 -0.45 3.12
(9.99) (10.11) (9.85)
Two + Years (B2N) 14.30** 14.01** 14.23**
(6.34) (6.34) (6.34)
Two + Years* Stronghold (B2S) -13.33 -16.60* -13.30
(8.97) (9.07) (9.00)
Politician - No. Years Served 0.73
(0.59)
Winner from CM Party 2.33
(15.53)
Observations 38669 38669 38669
R2 0.353 0.353 0.353
Mean Dependent Variable 70.17 70.17 70.17
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Project Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Party Fixed Effects YES YES YES
PANEL B: Testing for Differences in Levels: p-values
Test p-value
Ho: B2S = B2N 0.020 0.011 0.021
[1] * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
[2] Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency-term level.
[3] Dependent variable is time taken by the bureaucrat to complete projects in a district-constituency.
[4] Base Category is one year from promotion.
57
Table 1.12: Effect of Competition on Time Taken to Sanction: Role of Number of Bureau-
crats
PANEL [A]
(1) (2)
One Bureaucrat per Politician 76.90** 87.60***
(31.58) (31.52)
Two Bureaucrats per Politician 74.01** 78.36**
(31.41) (31.38)
Three Bureaucrats per Politician 104.95*** 112.40***
(31.85) (31.86)
Stronghold* One Bureaucrat -31.34***
(7.45)
Stronghold* Two Bureaucrats -9.10
(6.32)
Stronghold* Three Bureaucrats -8.57
(13.10)
Observations 149081 149081
R2 0.584 0.586
Mean Dependent Variable 77.53 77.53
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES
Project Type Fixed Effects YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
Party Fixed Effects YES YES
PANEL [B]
Testing for Differences in Levels
[i] Average Effects (Column 1) Test p-value
One Bur=Two Bur 0.489
Two Bur=Three Bur 0.000
[ii] Strongholds (Column 2) Test p-value
One Bur=Two Bur 0.018
Two Bur=Three Bur 0.971
[iii] Non-Strongholds (Column 2) Test p-value
One Bur=Two Bur 0.082
Two Bur=Three Bur 0.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency-term level.
Dependent variable is time taken by the bureaucrat to complete projects in a district-constituency.
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Table 1.13: Probability of Sanctioning Within X Days
(1) (2) (3)
<30 Days 30-45 Days >45 Days
Stronghold 0.07*** -0.01 -0.05*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Observations 180748 180748 180748
R2 0.367 0.249 0.370
Mean Dependent Variable 0.37 0.14 0.51
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Project Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency-term level.
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the project was sanctioned within ‘x’ days.
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Table 1.14: Probability of Sanctioning Within ‘X ′ Days - Project-wise
[A] Probability of Sanctioning Within 30 Days
Road Water Health Irrig Comm. Cent
Stronghold 0.05** 0.13*** 0.08* 0.27*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Observations 71529 24920 1690 2821 25093
R2 0.403 0.475 0.597 0.525 0.459
Mean Dependent Variable 0.37 0.40 0.32 0.49 0.32
[B] Probability of Sanctioning Between 30-45 Days
Road Water Health Irrig Comm. Cent
Stronghold 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 71529 24920 1690 2821 25093
R2 0.280 0.371 0.471 0.321 0.281
Mean Dependent Variable 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.11
[C] Probability of Sanctioning in More than 45 Days
Road Water Health Irrig Comm. Cent
Stronghold -0.06** -0.11*** -0.07 -0.19*** 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03)
Observations 71529 24920 1690 2821 25093
R2 0.394 0.470 0.627 0.514 0.471
Mean Dependent Variable 0.50 0.48 0.60 0.43 0.59
Bureaucrat Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Project Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency-term level.
Dependent variable: dummy that takes value 1 if the project was sanctioned within ‘x’ days.
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Chapter 2
Political Competition and Elite Capture of Local Public Goods
2.1 Introduction
In democratic countries, elections are a mechanism through which politicians are disciplined
by the public. In order to maintain power, the incumbents have an incentive to respond to
the wishes of the voters. These incentives are referred to as re-election concerns. If these
incentives are weak, then it is harder for the voters to hold the incumbent accountable for
their actions while they are in office.
When are the re-election concerns weakest? An incumbent politician’s actions will not be
affected by electoral pressures if he is certain that he is going to win for sure or lose for
sure. In the former case, the incumbent faces very little competition from his opponents
while in the latter case he provides very little competition to his opponents. Hence, in
low competition constituencies, we should expect re-election concerns to be weak. On the
other hand, in high competition areas, re-election concerns would be high.
If political competition increases the political accountability via re-election concerns, then
the question of how it affects public goods provision is an important one. There are several
studies that show that competition increases the level of spending on public goods 1. In this
chapter, we are interested in a complementary, but a different, question: how does political
competition affect the allocation of spending across different types of public goods? More
specifically, we are interesting in examining whether lack of competition leads to elite
capture in type of public goods provided.2
1See Brown and Hunter (1999,2004); Lake and Baum (2001) and Hecock (2006).
2Elite capture here is defined as provision of those public goods by the politicians that are demanded
by the rich.
61
Why should low competition lead to elite capture in public goods? Consider the context
where the distributions of income and wealth is highly skewed 3. This means the median
voter is relatively poor. Now, each individual in the economy has one vote. The rich,
however, tend to have a higher political clout compared to the poor. The bargaining power
of the voters depends on both the political clout as well as the demographic share. Different
groups may want different types of public goods. Which type of projects politicians choose
then depends on the relative bargaining power of the two groups.
When political competition is low, then the re-election concerns are weak. In absence of
politician’s electoral motives, poor have a low bargaining power. Hence, controlling for ide-
ological preferences of the politician, the resulting choice of public goods will then be driven
by the political clout and therefore, projects desired by the elites will be implemented.
Isolating the elite capture mechanism in provision of local public goods is a hard problem
because [a] there is reverse causality between political competition and public goods choices
and [b] unobserved characteristics can drive the choices of politicians. In this chapter, we
propose a new identification strategy that gives us an exogenous variation in political
competition and allows us to compare the choices of same politicians over time, hence
also solving the problem of unobserved characteristics. Our empirical strategy is to use an
information shock that resulted from changes in electoral boundaries. It led to effective
term limits for some incumbents. It is the same shock described in chapter 1.
We compare the public goods choices of the same politicians in the two groups before and
after this shock. The differences-in-difference (DID) strategy gives us a causal effect of
change in political competition on the public good choices. We find that the expenditure
shares on public goods desired by the elite increases when politicians have weaker re-election
concerns.
In order to isolate the mechanism, we look at the results of the DID strategy in strongholds
3Most developing countries exhibit such a pattern of wealth distribution.
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and compare it to the results for constituencies with high initial competition. The argu-
ment is that in low competition areas, the perceived probability of winning before the
announcement is close to one. The re-election concerns are already weak. If the news
shock hits, then the probability of winning goes to zero. Hence, the changes in re-election
concerns in low competition areas are very small. If re-election concerns are what are
driving politicians’ choices, we should not see any effect of the shock in low competition
areas. On the other hand, in high competition areas, the changes in perceived probability
of winning will be large due to the shock, hence we should see an effect there. Our results
confirm this hypothesis.
Our study makes four contributions. First, the main contribution pertains to the litera-
ture on role of democratic institutions in making politicians accountable. There is a vast
theoretical literature which hypothesizes that elections induce politicians to provide more
common interest policies (see Persson and Tabellini (2000)). The existing empirical liter-
ature examining this issue has largely focused on comparing democracies and autocratic
institutions. The evidence relating democratic transition to public goods and redistribu-
tion is mixed. Using cross-country data, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) find a positive effect
while Gil, Case, and Salai Martin (2004) find no effect. Foster and Rosenzweig (2005)
examine the effect of introduction of rural elections in India while Martinez-Bravo et. al
(2014) look at the case of China. The former shows that a shift towards democracy results
in decrease of elite capture of local public goods resources. Martinez-Bravo et al show that
introduction of village elections increased public good expenditure and reduced lease of
village land that benefitted the elites. The results form this chapter inform this debate
by showing that within a given set of institutions, lower democratic pressures increase the
allocation towards goods that elites prefer.
Secondly, we develop a novel dataset combining several sources of data. We obtain detailed
data for MPLAD projects in India with the unique feature that each politician has a fixed
budget. In existing empirical studies, the budget constraint is unobservable. This makes
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it problematic to study the effect of political competition on public goods expenditures
since amount raised to spend itself may depend on the level of competition. Boulding
and Brown (2012) explicitly show this using data from Brazilian municipalities. Moreover,
using MPLAD data allows us to directly observe the choices of politicians.
These features of the data allow us to study allocations across different public goods keeping
the spending budget constant. Most of the previous empirical literature looking at role
of political competition either focuses on level of spending or on a single public good. In
contrast, we analyze the effect of competition on portfolio of public goods projects made
by politicians. Moreover, our study is one of the few in the literature that explicitly looks
at voter demand for public goods using household survey and then relates it to the choices
of politicians. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)4 was one of the first papers to look at
preferences of voters and public goods provision, but they did not examine the role of
competition.
In addition to the project data, we obtain shapefiles for electoral boundaries before and
after the delimitation. We use ArcGIS for geospatial merging and overlapping in order to
identify the changes in constituencies and the reservation status. This exercise is central
to our identification strategy. We also use ArcGIS to identify which villages in the census
data belong to which electoral constituency. This then allows us to aggregate village char-
acteristics up to the parliamentary constituency level, hence controlling for infrastructural
need of the electoral districts. We then combine past election results obtained from the
Election Commission of India to the above database.
The third contribution of this chapter is that we propose a new identification strategy
to obtain an exogenous variation in political competition. Finding exogenous sources of
variation in political competition is hard, especially when the outcome variable is choice
of public goods. One of the techniques used in political cycle literature to get at reelection
4They find that random assignment of women to elected local office increases the provision of public
goods that women expressed preference for.
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concerns is term limits (see Besley and Case (1995), Smart and Sturm (2013)). Term limits
provide us with situations where politicians facing these limits do not have any re-election
concerns. We can then compare the behavior of these politicians with those that do not
face any term limit. However, several democracies, including India, do not have any term
limits and hence this strategy cannot be used. We develop a similar strategy based on
information shock that also shuts down the reelection concerns for some incumbents and
we compare actions of these politicians with those who are not affected. The difference in
our strategy is that we are able to observe changes in choices of the same politician within
the same term. Our strategy can be used in other contexts as well, especially to instrument
for political competition at lower levels of governance in India.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on elite capture by showing that political compe-
tition affects elite capture. Our results are contrary to that in Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2006) which looks at, inter alia, the role of competition. Their study does not find any
effect of political competition on targeting, nor do they find any evidence of elite capture
in private goods. On the other hand, our results show that lack of political competition
results in an increase in expenditure share on projects desired by the rich. While their
work and others in the literature look at whether the rich are able to benefit from targeted
transfers and programs, the focus of this chapter is on public goods provision.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 gives a brief background of the
institutional structures in India and section 2.3 provides a conceptual framework for our
analysis. We outline our empirical strategy in section 2.4 and give details of the data used
in section 2.5. We provide the main results in section 2.6 and robustness checks in section
2.7. The final section provides the concluding remarks and an outline of the future work.
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2.2 Institutional Background
Our analysis focuses on local public goods provision by politicians in India. The politicians
we are going to focus on are the Members of Parliament (MPs) that are representatives of
their constituents in the lower house of the parliament which is called the Lok Sabha. Note
that these are national level politicians. There are 543 constituencies and elections are
held every five years where candidates are selected through universal suffrage. India has a
plurality system where the candidate with the highest vote share wins (also called "first-
past-the-post"). Moreover, there is a multiple party system and candidates are allowed to
contest independently as well.
When it comes to public goods provision, there are many sources of funds for the infras-
tructure projects. The central government has its own budget that it allocates for public
goods through various schemes. For example, for the scheme of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
or Universalization of Elementary Education (UEE), the central government allocates a
portion of its budget each year to all administrative districts. The district head along with
bureaucrats in the district development authorities are responsible for implementation of
this scheme. The local politicians or the members of parliament representing those districts
do not choose the the nature of the projects nor do they have a role to play in deciding
the inter-village allocation of budget, although they may influence the process. Similar
to central schemes, there are state government schemes that are decided by the council
of ministers in the state legislative assemblies. Again, the money comes to the district
authorities and they implement the schemes.
Since we are interested in how competition affects public goods choices, we want to look
at variations across politicians and directly observe their actions. We want to look at
projects that are decided individually by politicians within their own constituencies. The
local public goods projects under the Scheme MPLAD (Member of Parliament Local Area
Development Scheme) in India provide us with such a situation. Under this scheme, each
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MP is given Rs. 20 million (0.5 million USD) per year to spend anywhere within his
constituency. The money can be only spent in asset building projects. This means that
politicians cannot hire employees, give grants and loans, or purchase inventory or stock
with this money. Moreover, the guidelines say that acquisition of land, building assets for
individual benefits and building religious structures is not permissible. In short, most of
the permissible works are construction-based and are for infrastructure development within
the constituency. This feature makes it easier for us to compare across different types of
projects - roads, education and health.
This dataset has several advantage. Firstly, the choice of the politicians is directly ob-
servable for the whole country. For the MPLAD projects, the politician gives a written
recommendation of the projects to the district administrative head. The bureaucrat then
gives approval to the projects and the project is implemented. The bureaucrats cannot
change the nature of the recommendation and as long as the the MPLAD guidelines are
met and project is feasible, the approval is made. In the literature, most studies evaluating
public goods provision either [a] look at changes in stock of infrastructure from census over
two snapshots (Bannerjee and Smanathan (2007), Blakeslee (2013)) or [b] carry out village
infrastructure surveys. In both cases, whether the public good was provided due to the
politicians decision or bureaucrat’s decision or a result of some central government scheme
cannot be distinguished. Use of MPLAD projects allows us to unambiguously assign the
choice of the projects to politicians.
Secondly, there is a fixed budget for each politician. In most studies, the budget constraint
is unobservable. This allows us to go beyond the question of whether competition increases
the public good provision to the question of composition of public goods - which projects get
a higher proportion? Lastly, We have panel data on public good projects. This allows us to
compare choices of politicians over time and hence control for unobservable characteristics
using fixed effects.
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2.3 Conceptual Framework
Consider an incumbent politician sitting in office. Given a fixed budget, the choice of public
goods can be an outcome of various motives: [1] re-election concerns [2] ideology [3] rent-
seeking/corruption motive [4] gaining influence with elites5 and [5] actual infrastructural
need of the constituency 6. Each of these motives has a different prediction for which type
of public good will be chosen.
If re-election concerns are strong then, the politician would chose projects that will get
him elected. The Downsian theories predict that those projects will be taken up which
the median voter wants. The wealth distribution in India is very skewed, making the
median voter poor. Hence, re-election concerns would lead to adoption of projects that
are demanded by the relatively poor. On the other hand, the motive of gaining influence
with elites would make the politicians choose the projects that the voters at the top of the
wealth distribution demand. Project choices driven by ideological and rent-seeking motives
do not depend on the voter demand but instead are determined by politician’s preferences
and the nature of projects.
Our main goal is to understand how electoral competition affects public good choices -
does it make politicians accountable to voters’ demands? Which of the above motives is
stronger depends on the extent of political competition. In high competition areas, re-
election concerns are high, hence politicians are more likely to choose what poor want. In
low competition areas, election concerns are weak and hence the politician’s choices may be
outcome of an interaction of the other three motives. In order to get a prediction for how
5Note that both [3] and [4] can be called rent-seeking but we make a distinction because they are different
in terms of behavior of the politicians. In [3], the politicians seek to skim-off some of the funds for their
personal gains. They are not favoring the poor or the rich in any strategic way. If their decision leads to
the rich being better off, it is an outcome of their choice, not the motive for their choice. On the other
hand, in [4] there is no leakage but the choice of public goods gets them favors from the elites. In this case,
the rich being better off is a motive of their choice.
6If a particular type of infrastructure is not available, then this represents an "actual need" as opposed
to demand by voters.
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competition affects policy choice, we need an empirical strategy that allows us to isolate
these possible mechanisms.
We approach this issue backwards: what happens if the re-election concerns completely shut
down? This motive will completely shut down if the politicians perceive their probability
of winning to be zero. In this case, if we control for ideology, margins for rent-seeking,
and actual infrastructural need, then the effect of political competition on choice of public
goods is only through the politician’s motive of gaining influence of the elites. Following
this line of argument, we develop an empirical strategy to show that in absence of political
competition, there is an elite capture of public goods.
2.4 Empirical Identification Strategy
Our empirical strategy is to use an information shock that resulted from changes in electoral
boundaries.7 This shock that exogenously changed some incumbent’s perceived probability
of winning in the next elections to zero while not affecting other incumbents. The politicians
who were affected by the shock are the treated group while those who are not affected by
this shock are the control group. We can compare the public goods choices of the treated
and control groups before and after this shock. Since this event essentially causes an
exogenous change in the electoral competition, the differences-in-difference strategy will
give us a causal effect of change in political competition on the public good choices.
Now, the information shock shuts down the re-election concern. We still have to dis-
entangle the gaining influence with elites motive with [a] ideology [b] rent-seeking motive
via kickbacks from the project and [c] actual need for the infrastructure projects. Ideology
of a politician can be thought of as his own underlying preferences over public goods. Since
the politicians are free to choose the party they want to join, they self-select into parties
7The details of this shock are provided in section 1.5.
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whose agenda is close to their own personal preferences.
We therefore assume that the ideological preferences of the politicians are a function of the
party ideology and a random component that is distributed i.i.d. This is to say that within
a party, there is some heterogeneity in preferences but these differences do not depend on
political competition in any systematic way. This is a reasonable assumption because the
ideology we are talking about here are inherent preferences assigned by nature at birth
and not some strategic choice made by politicians to signal their ideology. Hence, we use
party fixed effects to control for ideology of the politicians. Moreover, since we are using
difference-in-differences to look at how choices of the same politician changed, the ideology
of politician is differenced out.
Consider now the rent-seeking motive. There are two stages where incumbents can "skim
off" money from these projects. The first stage is the contracting stage. In this case, while
choosing who to assign construction contracts to, politicians may favor relatives or those
that provide them kickbacks. The second one is the implementation stage. In this case,
the way to extract rents is through use of inferior materials and charge for superior ones
or to fudge accounts for wage payments when there aren’t any.
In the MPLAD scheme, all the projects that are chosen by the politician are asset building
projects and they are mainly construction projects. The MPs have to recommend which
agency to give the contract to for each type of project, hence the motive of getting kickbacks
for exchange of contracts should not effect the type of public goods chosen. The politician
can give contracts for school construction as easily as for road construction.
Moreover, since all these projects are construction based, they all have high material-labor
ration. This means that margins for making money should not be systematically different.
Hence, in both contracting and implementation stage, institutional feature provides no
reason to expect that any one project will be chosen over the other for the purpose of
rent-seeking.
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We control for the actual need of the villages in the constituency by the distribution of
available infrastructure using Census 2001 data. For each village, we obtain data for
whether the villages have a primary, secondary and a high school, whether the approach
road is paved, whether there is electricity in each cluster of the village, the source of
drinking water, the method used for irrigation, the nearest health center and so on. This
stock of existing infrastructure gives us an idea about what types of public goods are not
available in the village. This controls for actual "need" as opposed to demand of the voters.
In summary, the identification strategy proposed rests on the information shock that in-
cumbents of the 2004-2009 term got in 2007. We compare the public goods choices of the
group that were affected by the shock to those who were not affected. There are two types
of treatment group [1] REStoGEN - constituencies that were reserved for SC/ST candi-
dates in 2004 but were not going to be reserved in 2009 and [2] GENtoRES - constituencies
that were not reserved in 2004 were but were announced to be reserved in the next election.
For both these treatment groups, the perceived probability of winning for the incumbents
went to zero as a result of the information shock. Hence, there was an exogenous change
in political competition. We control for the ideology using party fixed effects and the ac-
tual need using distribution of existing stock of infrastructure. The difference-in-difference
strategy, therefore, gives us a causal interpretation of the effect of change in competition
on choice of public goods. We estimate the DID model separately for each type of public
good, thus looking at variations across constituencies within a project type. This controls
for potential differences in rent-seeking margins across project types.
2.5 Data and Summary Statistics
As we discussed earlier, the project choices we look at are the local public goods chosen
by politicians in India under the MPLAD scheme. We look at the data from 1999-2009
covering two terms of Lok Sabha: 1999-2004 and 2004-2009. During this period, each MP is
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given Rs. 20 million (0.5 million USD) per year to spend anywhere within his constituency.
This seems like a small amount but back-of-the-envelope calculations show that this money
is enough for a politician to build a 100m road in each village in his constituency over a 5
year term 8.
Table 2.2 gives the summary statistics for MPLAD projects. Column (1) gives the total
number of projects for each project category. Road projects are the biggest in number,
constituting 33.5% of all projects, followed by community center projects at 19%. As can be
seen in column (4) higher number of projects also translate into higher average expenditure
shares.
Drinking water and education both constitute around 11% of the total number of projects.
The expenditure shares of these two project types is, however, different. While education
is 12%, water constitutes 7.3% of the expenditure share. The reason why their share in
number of projects are the same but share of expenditure different is because the average
cost per project is different across the two categories. Column (2) shows that while drinking
water projects cost around 95,000 Rupees, average cost for education infrastructure projects
is Rupees 186,000.
Expenditure shares of Irrigation and Health are around 2% each. The number of projects
for both these categories is also very low: 5900 for the former and 4200 for the latter. One
of the reason why there are such few of irrigation and health projects could be because,
on an average, they are much more expensive than other projects. The average cost for
all projects in the database is Rupees 162,007. As can be seen from column (2) of table
2.2, the cost of health projects is twice the average while for irrigation, it is one and a half
times the mean.
8On an average, there are 1000 villages per electoral constituency. Based on interviews with engineers,
a 100m road can be built in about 100,000 rupees. This means that to build one 100m road in each village
over a 5 year period, the politician would need Rupees (1000∗100,000)5 per year. This is equal to 20 million a
year which is exactly what the politicians get under the MPLAD scheme.
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Since we are primarily interested in knowing if in low competition areas, the politicians
are more likely to chose the projects the elites want, we first need to know the distribution
of voter demand. We use the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS 2006) to
understand what types of public goods different group of voters want.
The REDS 2006 surveyed 9500 rural households across 259 villages in India.9 The house-
hold questionnaires provide information on assets, land holdings and incomes; household
member characteristics including educational attainment, school enrollment, and work par-
ticipation. The 2006 round includes detailed current and retrospective information of
participation in governance, and questions that can elicit household’s preferences for and
perception of delivery of public goods.
The demand for public goods are elicited by analyzing the responses to the following ques-
tion: "If the government wishes to spend Rs. 100,000 (rupees hundred thousand) on local
development and it is undecided regarding the nature of allocation and expects that pan-
chayat has to arrive at a formula to allocate it then how would you advice the panchayat
to allocate this amount on these issues (%)?10" The respondents were given a list of 14
public goods and they had to allocate the amount across these issues.
The immediate question is whether these responses constitute voter demand. Now, when
the households are splitting the pie across the 14 categories, their decision is driven by [a]
their preferences and [b] what they think it costs to build these projects. For example, a
household may really want the government to provide drinking water but they may also
care about roads. If road projects cost more than water, they may assign a higher pro-
9We thank Prof. Andrew Foster of Brown University for sharing this data with us.
10The surveyors were directed to make sure that the respondents are asked to divide the amount across
the 14 issues tabulated in the questionnaire in percentages.
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portion to roads even if they prefer water over roads. Our argument is that whether the
households assign a higher proportion to project p due to underlying preferences or due
to their beliefs about project cost, the allocation they propose is their demand. When we
think of politicians who are running for office and who are deciding their policy platforms,
they listen to what voters are asking for, not why they are asking for it. For the purpose
of this chapter, we are interested in understanding what the rich want and what types of
public goods the poor put a higher weight on. Hence, it suffices to look at their demanded
allocations. We leave the detailed analysis of voter demand formation for future work.
The summary statistics for the responses to this question are given in table 2.3. Column (2)
shows the average proportion allocated by households to each type of public goods while
column (3) gives the standard deviations. Column (4) shows the percent of households
that assigned a non-zero weight to the particular type of project. We can see from the
table that 66% of the households assigned a non-zero amount to water and the average
proportion assigned is 24% of the funds. Roads, sanitation and health are other important
categories where about half of the respondents assigned positive proportions. The average
proportion assigned to these projects are 15.17%, 13.45% and 11.25% respectively.
Our ultimate aim is to classify the local public goods chosen by politicians under the
MPLAD scheme according to voter preferences. For this reason, we focus on those projects
that comprise of almost all of the expenditure in the MPLAD database. These projects
are: water, roads, sanitation, health, irrigation, education, and social issues 11.
We use the 2001 Census of India to obtain village characteristics. The demographic vari-
11One of the projects that appear frequently in the MPLAD database is community centers. These
centers typically consist of one or two big halls where people of the village/community can gather for
meetings, festival celebrations, weddings etc. We proxy the preferences for community centre by household’s
preferences for social issues
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ables include: population, density of population, SC and ST population shares. The census
village directories also give details of village infrastructure. These include: schools, drink-
ing water facility, power supply, irrigation methods, health facilities and whether approach
roads are paved or not. We use these characteristics to control for the need within the
constituency since one can imagine that the choice of public good projects may reflect the
needs of the constituents. We also control for the distribution of occupation characteristics:
total workers, marginal workers, classifications according to agricultural laborer, cultiva-
tor and businesses etc. We aggregate all these characteristics up-to the constituency level
unless otherwise mentioned.
The election data is obtained from the Election Commission of India. The data is for three
Lok Sabha terms: 1999-2004, 2004-2009 and 2009-2013 for all 543 constituencies. The
election results give us information about whether the constituency is reserved, the details
of candidates that contested as well as the vote shares of each candidate. Characteristics
of contestants include the caste status, their age and gender. We use both the candidate
and constituency characteristics in 2004 and 2009 elections to define our treatment and
control group.
As discussed earlier, the boundaries of the electoral constituencies changed from 2009 elec-
tions. In order to match the constituencies before and after delimitation, we use ArcGIS to
carry out geospatial mapping. We overlay the boundaries of 2004 constituencies with the
2009 boundaries and calculate the extent of overlap using shapefiles. The overlapping exer-
cise does not give us a one-to-one match since small portions of the original constituencies
get chopped off and added to other constituencies. However, in most cases the majority
of the "old" constituency belongs to a single "new" one. In 70% of the cases, the name of
the constituencies remained the same. For the rest of the constituencies, the way we do
one-to-one mapping is in two steps: [Step 1] Find the the largest overlap [Step 2] Manually
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check whether the largest overlap corresponds to the old constituency.
2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 Results from the HH Survey
In order to test our hypothesis, we first need to understand what the voters demand.
Specifically, we want to know what the rich want and what the poor care about. In this
sub-section, we present the results of the REDS 2006 household survey that sheds light on
this issue. We use two separate measures of wealth in our analysis: [1] value of consumer
durable assets owned by the households and [2] value of land. These do not include the
value of the house.
Consider the following model where i denotes the household and v denotes a village:
yivp = α+
∑
j
βj ∗Assetiv,j +
∑
k
γkXk,iv + δv + iv ...(1)
where j refers to the jth quartile of the wealth distribution. In all our specifications, we
will take the base category to be the bottom 25th quartile. The coefficient βj will then
give us an idea of change the probability of assigning any weight on project p when the
household belongs to quartile j compared to the average household in bottom quartile. Xk
refers to the kth HH characteristics and δv captures the village fixed effects.
Table 2.4 gives the result for the above specification. Each column corresponds to a public
good p and gives results for the effect of the wealth distribution on the proportion assigned
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by the household on each public good p. We divide the wealth distribution as quartiles
and break up the top quartile into 75th-90th percentile and top 10th percentile. All spec-
ifications include village fixed effects and control for household characteristics.
The constant term gives us the average proportion assigned by the bottom quartile of
wealth distribution (the really poor households). As we can see, water has the highest
proportion assigned at around 50%. Road and health are the other two big categories for
the poor with average proportions at 16% and 10% respectively. Irrigation is at 6.3% while
sanitation, education and social issues have very small relative proportions.
If we compare the higher quartiles to the bottom quartile, we find that proportions as-
signed to irrigation increases monotonically with wealth. The average probability at top
10 percentiles is about 10% compared to 6.3% at the bottom quartile. On the other hand,
the proportion for water falls as wealth increases. Even though at the top 10 percentiles,
the average effect is about 4% less than the base category, the proportion assigned to water
is still huge at around 45%. There is some heterogeneity for road projects but it is not
monotonic in wealth. The other projects do not have any heterogeneous effect of wealth
on proportions assigned.
To alleviate concerns that the above results could be due to the choice of functional form
or discrete nature of the wealth measure, we estimate a variant of model (1) where we
replace wealth dummies with a continuous measure. We include a quadratic term as we
expect the effect of wealth to diminish as wealth increases. Table 2.5 gives the results of
the specification. Column (2) shows that the coefficients of the the wealth measures are
both significant - increase in wealth by 100,000 Rupees increases the allocation made to
irrigation by 1.5% on an average. This effect diminishes as wealth increases. There is no
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significant effect of wealth on any of the other public good types.
We now measure wealth in an alternative way: value of land owned. We estimate model
(1) with land distribution instead of value of assets. Table 2.6 gives results of this spec-
ification. As we see in column (2), the allocation assigned to irrigation is monotonically
increasing in value of land and the coefficients are significantly different from the bottom
wealth quartile. There is little heterogeneity in the effect of value of land on allocations on
other public goods except health. The proportion allocated on health decreases as wealth
increases.
These results suggest that we can consider irrigation as an elite good. To make the case
for this stronger, let us now focus on one socio-economic group of households that are
often marginalized: the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled tribes (ST)12. We expand
the model specification in equation (1) to include SC and ST dummies. Table 2.7 gives
the results of this specification. Column (2) shows that, controlling for wealth, the SC
households are significantly less likely to allocate to irrigation by a magnitude of 1.6%.
They are also less likely to allocate to roads. ST households also allocate less to irrigation
but the estimates for this group is imprecise. Hence, overall, it seems that the marginalized
groups put less weight on irrigation.
The main takeaway from the results of the household survey is that irrigation is a public
good that elites put a large weight on. This result is robust for different measures of wealth.
In fact, controlling for wealth, if we look at the choices of the socio-economically backward
groups of SC and ST, we find that they assign a significantly less proportion on irrigation,
hence supporting the hypothesis that irrigation is an elite public good.
12See Pande (2003) for a discussion on SC/STs being disadvantaged minorities.
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2.6.2 Results of the Difference-in-difference Strategy
We now turn to our main analysis. Our outcome variables of interest are the expenditure
shares allocated by politicians to different types of projects from their fixed MPLAD bud-
gets. We want to see how the information shock that takes the probability of winning to
zero in the treatment group affects these expenditure shares.
Let ypcts denote the expenditure share of project p in constituency c of state s at time t.
We estimate the following model:
ypcts = αpcts + β1 ∗ Post2007cts + β2 ∗ Treatmentcts
+ β3 ∗ Post2007 ∗ Treatcts +
k∑
1
γk ∗Xcts,k + cts ...(2)
where Post2007cts is a variable that takes value 1 for the years 2008 and 2009 and zero
for 2004-2007. The dummy for our treatment group is Treatmentcts. Recall that our
treatment is defined as those constituencies where there was a change in reservation status
following the redrawing of electoral boundaries. β3 is our difference-in-difference coefficient.
It compares the change in expenditure allocations before and after information shock for
the control group with the change in expenditures for the treatment group.
Based on the nature of the identification strategy as well as the HH survey results, our
hypothesis is that for irrigation projects; β3 > 0. Since budget is fixed, increase in expen-
diture on irrigation means decrease in expenditure on some other project. However, we do
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not get a clear prediction about where the fall should be: roads, drinking water or health
projects?13 Since we do not have a clear prior on how the information shock should affect
other projects, we will focus our attention on irrigation although we present the results for
other projects as well.
Table 2.8 gives results of estimation of model (2) where the treated group is REStoGEN,
i.e., the constituencies that were reserved in 2004 Lok Sabha elections but were announced
that will be open to all contestants in 2009 elections. Column (2) shows that the coefficient
of the difference-in-difference term is positive and significant. The magnitude is 0.56 mean-
ing that the shock increased the expenditure share of irrigation projects by 0.56 percentage
points. This seems like a small magnitude but if we compare it to the mean of dependent
variable, the increase is 25% of the unconditional mean. There is no significant effect of
the shock on any other public good.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 look at results where the treatment groups are GENtoRES and ‘BOTH’
respectively. Recall that GENtoRES constituencies are one where there was no restriction
on castes of candidates contesting elections but in 2007 it was announced that these elec-
toral districts were going to be served for either SC or ST groups. ‘BOTH’ refers to both
the treatment groups - GENtoRES and REStoGEN. Combining the treatment groups gives
us more power. Results of both 2.9 and 2.10 are similar to table 2.8: the shock had a pos-
itive and significant effect on irrigation and no effect on other public goods.
The above tables look at the change in the level of the expenditure share. In order to
13Recall that when we use value of assets as the wealth, we find a monotonically decreasing effect of
wealth on water allocations, but the slope of the coefficient was flat. When we measure wealth as value
of land, there was no effect on water but allocation on health had a significant negative relationship with
wealth. The results on irrigation, on the other hand, were robust to many specifications and alternative
measures of wealth.
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evaluate how the expenditure shares for these projects change with respect to the initial
shares, we now look at the semi-log specification of model (2). In this case, we can derive
the percentage change in the expenditure share as a result of the reservation shock from
β3. Table 2.13 shows the result of this specification. As we can see from column (2), the
percentage change in expenditure share of irrigation is 11%. Hence, the percentage change
in amount allocated to irrigation is quite large.
The interpretation of the results are the following: controlling for infrastructural need, ide-
ology and rent-seeking margins, if we shut down the re-election motives for the politicians,
we find that they increase expenditure shares on the projects that are demanded by the
elites. This gives us evidence in favor of existence of elite capture of local public goods
when political competition is low.
2.6.3 Isolating the Mechanism
The proposed mechanism behind why the reservation shock affected allocation to expendi-
ture is that the information changed the perceived probability of winning for the incumbents
in the treatment groups to zero. This means that the re-election concerns were suddenly
shut down. We argue that this is what is driving the change in the behavior of the politi-
cians before and after the shock. To shed some light this, we now focus on two-sub samples:
[1] Strongholds - where the incumbents had won by large victory margins in the previous
election (top 25th quartile of victory margin distribution) and [2] High Competition con-
stituencies - where the margin of victory was very close (≤ 4%) in the previous elections
(bottom 25th quartile of victory margin distribution).
Consider stronghold constituencies first. In these electoral districts, the incumbents came
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into power in 2004 with a large victory margin such that the probability of winning is very
high. This implies the re-election concerns are weak to begin with. If the information shock
hits, then their re-election concerns go to zero. But the change in re-election concerns for
these politicians is very small. If our hypothesis is correct, then we should not see any
change the behavior of the politicians. More specifically, this suggests that we should not
find any effect on irrigation expenditures for treated group compared to control when we
look at constituencies that are strongholds.
Point B in figure 2.2 depicts the case of a stronghold politician. When the shock occurs in
2007 and the politician finds out he cannot contest in the next term, then the probability
of winning jumps to zero. Now, when the politician was at point B, he knew that he was
going to win with a high probability. Hence, the re-election concerns would be weak. So
when the news comes and he jumps to point C, there is no substantial change in re-election
concerns and hence no change in irrigation expenditures. Table 2.11 gives the result for
this sub-sample. We see that there is indeed no effect of the information shock on the
allocations to irrigation projects.
Let’s now turn to the high competition constituencies. In a two candidate case, a very
small victory margin would mean that the probability of winning for the incumbent is
close to half 14. Point A in figure 2.2 would reflect such a situation. For the incumbent
sitting at A, the re-election concerns are really high. So if the information shock takes the
probability of winning to zero, then the changes in re-election concerns are huge. So, if re-
election concerns are driving everything, we should see an effect on expenditure shares on
irrigation in this case. The hypothesis is that the expenditure on irrigation should increase.
Table 2.12 gives the result of the sub-sample of constituencies that were high competition
in the beginning of the term. We can see in column (2) that the difference-in-difference
14The corresponding case for three candidates could be anywhere between 1/3rd and 1/2
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coefficient for irrigation projects is positive and statistically significant,
From the above results we can conclude that it is indeed the shutting down of the re-
election concerns that is driving the results. This shows that electoral pressures play an
important role in public goods provision. It makes politicians accountable to the voters.
In absence of these electoral pressures, politicians are more likely to spend on projects that
are desired by the rich.
2.7 Robustness Checks
2.7.1 A Placebo Test
We now present the results of a placebo test in order to address the concerns that the tim-
ing of the information shock with respect to the election cycle may be driving the result.
Our design of the placebo test is outlined in figure 2.3. Our analysis of the difference-
in-difference strategy has focused on the election term 2004- 2009. Since we have data
beginning 1999, we can use the 1999-2004 data to create a ‘fake’ shock at the same time
in the election cycle as the real shock of 2007. The corresponding ‘fake’ shock would occur
in December 2002 of that term. We keep the treatment and the control groups the same
and estimate a diff-in-diff specification on 1999-2004 data.
The results of this exercise are given in table 2.14. As we can see, there is no effect of
the ‘fake’ shock on allocation to irrigation projects or on any other public goods. Hence,
it cannot be the timing of the shock with respect to the election cycle that generates the
results.
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2.7.2 Timing of Announcement
One of the concerns with the proposed diff-in-diff strategy could be that the politicians may
have known whether their constituency is going to be reserved before the actual report came
out. One immediate question that comes to mind is: if the delimitation commission was set
up in 2002, could the politicians know in 2005 what the fate of their constituency is going
to be? The answer is no. According to the Presidential Notification No. 282/DEL/2007
15, the re-districting process started only in June 2004 which is after the 2004 elections.
Moreover, as is clear from the release, by August 2007, the process had been completed
only in 25 states out of the 35 states and Union Territories in India. The process in the
other states got completed only towards end of 2007. So, it is conceivable that the politi-
cians in some states may have predicted the status of change in reservation mid-2007 but
certainly not in 2006.
Since we know for sure that the politicians did not know the changes made to the bound-
aries in 2005 and 2006, predicting whether there will be change in the reservation status
would be very hard in these years since the prediction depends on redistricting of other
constituencies as well. After 2007, it is certain that they knew the change in the reservation
status. Hence, the change in behavior between 2004-06 and 2008-09 can be attributed to
the information shock, without worrying about the exact month of the shock. This sug-
gests that we can re-estimate model (2) by removing projects chosen in the calendar year
2007 to get cleaner results.
Table 2.15 shows the result of the specification without the projects recommended in year
2007. The magnitude of the effect remains the same as before: the expenditure on irriga-
tion increases by 0.6% as a result of the delimitation. Hence, our results in the chapter do
15http://eci.nic.in/delim/Press/PN_17082007.pdf
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not suffer from potential mis-measurement of the timing of the shock.
2.7.3 IV Strategy
Till now, we have used the news shock regarding the changes in reservation status in a
differences-in-difference framework. This event can also be used to analyze how exogenous
change in competition affects the change in public goods provision using an instrument
variables approach.
Consider the following model. Let ypcts denote the expenditure share of project p in
constituency c of state s at time t. Then we have:
ypcts = αpcts + β ∗ E[Prob_winningpcs] +
k∑
1
γk ∗Xcts,k + cts ...(3)
where, E[Prob_winningpcs] denotes the perceived or expected probability of winning by
an incumbent politician and X is a vector of other covariates.
The expected probability of winning is not observable. If we assume rational expectations,
then we can use actual results of the next election to measure expected probability of win-
ning. The measure would be a dummy that takes value 1 if the incumbent politician wins
the next election and zero if he loses. Using the results of the next election poses the obvi-
ous problem of reverse causality since the choices of public goods are likely to affect election
outcomes in the future. Hence, we would need an instrument for probability of winning
in the next elections. This instrument should be correlated with probability of winning
and should not directly affect the public good choices, only through probability of winning.
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As we saw earlier, in the 2004-2009 term, some of the politicians were affected by the
2007 announcement of the change in reservation status. In the treated constituencies, the
perceived probability of winning changed post 2007. In control group, there was no change
in probability of winning. This suggests that we can use whether or not the constituency
was hit by a shock as an instrument for change in perceived probability of winning. We
can then use this instrument to study the effect of competition on public good choices.
Let us analyze the First Stage of the instrument variables approach. The following spec-
ification depicts the model that looks at the correlation between the instrument and the
probability of winning:
Prob_winningpcs = X
′
ctsΠ10 + Π11 ∗ Treatedcts + ξ1,cts ...(4)
For ‘Treated’ to be a relevant and a valid instrument we need to check that [a] Π11 should
be significantly different from zero and according to the rule of thumb, the F-statistic for
the instrument should be greater than 10 and [b] Exclusion restrictions should be satisfied.
Table 2.16 gives the estimates of model (4). The difference between the three columns are
the controls in the specification. Specification (3) shows the results where the instrument
as well all the exogenous variables are included as regressors. The coefficient Π11 shows
that if a constituency is treated, then on an average, the probability that the incumbent
wins in the next election falls by 32%. This magnitude is very large and is statistically
significant at 1%. The F-statistic on for instrument is 63.61, indicating that the instrument
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is relevant, hence satisfying condition [a] as mentioned above.
Now, our instrument is capturing an announcement shock for a politician who is already
in office. The exclusion restriction is satisfied since the only way information shock af-
fects public goods provision is through the changes in incentive of politician due to fall
in expected probability of winning. Moreover, the shock is not correlated to any of the
constituency characteristics at the beginning of the term. This is because the reservation
status changed due to changes in boundaries of the constituencies, not due to any demo-
graphic shares within the boundary. Hence, our instrument is valid.
We now present the results of the following 2SLS model:
̂Prob_winningpcs = X
′
ctsΠ̂10 + Π̂11 ∗ Treatedcts ...(4
′)
∆ypcs = X
′
csΠ20 + Π21 ∗ ̂Prob_winningpcs + ξ2,cs ...(5)
where, ∆ypcs gives the change in expenditure for project p between before and after the
2007 shock.
Table 2.17 gives results of (5). As we can see from column (2), 1% change in probability of
winning increases the expenditure share on irrigation significantly by 1 percentage points.
This effect is similar to what we saw in the differences-in-difference estimates. Moreover,
the 2SLS results show that there is a significant fall in the expenditure on water as proba-
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bility of winning rises. So, not only are they spending more on something rich put a higher
weight on, but they are simultaneously spending less on the most demanded public good
and the top preference of the median voter. This result makes our evidence in favor of the
elite capture hypothesis even stronger.
2.8 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
In this chapter, we addressed the following question: How does political competition affect
allocation of spending across different types of public goods? Our main hypothesis is that
lack of competition leads to elite capture. In order to examine this issue, we construct a
novel database and propose a new identification strategy based on information shock an-
nouncing changes in reservation status. We provide evidence in favor of our hypothesis and
show that the main channel through which this happens is through weakened re-election
concerns.
Using REDS 2006 HH survey, we first show that irrigation is an ‘elite’ public good. Using
the project data, we then go on to show that an exogenous decease in probability of win-
ning towards zero led to an increase in expenditure share of irrigation projects. We further
show that this effect is coming from the constituencies that had a high competition in the
beginning of the term since these are the constituencies where the re-election concerns fall
the most. We check for robustness of the results by using an IV strategy. We instrument
probability of winning by a dummy variable that takes value one if the constituencies were
affected by the news shock. The IV results are stronger: when re-election concerns fall,
we find evidence that there is not only higher expenditure shares on irrigation but also
significantly lower expenditures on drinking water. These results provide evidence in favor
of our hypothesis that lack of competition leads to elite capture of public goods.
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One of the concerns with our results is that even though it is robust and significant statis-
tically, the magnitude of the effects in DID strategy are small. The magnitudes are small
in absolute terms but relative to the average expenditure, they are huge. However, to make
the results more meaningful, we are in the process of developing a model that will give us a
mapping from the observable expenditure shares on different projects to the unobservable
welfare weights on different demographic groups. The argument is that even if the absolute
magnitudes of increase in expenditure share of irrigation is small, it may map into large
effects on the welfare weight assigned to the elites by the politicians.
In conclusion, the results of our analysis show that electoral pressures play an important
role in public goods provision. It makes politicians accountable to the voters. In absence of
these electoral pressures, politicians are more likely to spend on projects that are desired
by the rich. This is an important message and it contributes to the recent debates in
the literature which questions the importance of elite capture in redistribution and public
goods provision. There has recently been a huge push towards decentralization of policy
making and one of the concerns of this has been whether the elites capture the benefits.
Our study suggests that as long as politicians are held accountable to the people and voters
hold a tight leash around the necks of the representatives, the political clout of the elites
will be in check. Decentralized decision-making without corresponding strong accountabil-
ity mechanisms may create room for elite capture.
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Appendix
Figure 2.1: Timing of Announcement
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Table 2.1: Proportion of SC/ST Candidates and Winners
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - MPLAD Projects
No. of Projects Cost of Projects Avg Share of
Expenditure
Mean Std Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Roads 130717 1.84 2.90 34.73
Community Center 74797 1.51 2.39 20.02
Education 42168 1.86 3.59 12.09
Water 41598 0.95 2.23 7.27
Irrigation 5857 2.52 3.60 2.14
Health 4192 3.25 4.01 1.88
[1] These do not constitute an exhaustive list of projects chosen by politicians,
but they are 77% of total expenditure under MPLAD.
[2] Other projects are: animal shelters, cremation grounds, electrification, emergency equipment,
non-conventional energy, parks, public transport, sanitation, shelters and work-sheds,
and sports infrastructure.
[3] Cost of Project is measured in Rupees 100,000
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Table 2.3: REDS HH Survey: Avg Proportion Allocated by Households to Each Public
Good
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Obs Mean Std Dev % HHs
allocating
Non-zero
Amount
Water 8660 23.93 22.40 66.00
Roads 8660 15.17 17.81 55.20
Sanitation 8660 13.45 19.18 44.16
Health 8660 11.25 16.04 44.68
Irrigation 8660 8.01 18.19 21.77
Streetlights 8660 6.69 11.74 32.53
Education 8660 6.32 11.94 28.71
Electrification 8660 4.99 10.78 24.49
Employment 8660 2.29 8.58 09.33
Credit Input Subsidies 8660 1.89 8.32 07.97
Access to Govt Schemes 8660 1.82 8.20 07.32
Natural Resource Mgmt 8660 0.87 4.91 04.57
Communication 8660 0.86 4.03 05.88
Social Issues 8660 0.58 3.30 04.23
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Table 2.4: REDS HH Survey: Effect of Asset Distribution on Proportions Assigned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percentile road irrig water sanit health educ social
Between 25-50th 1.51∗∗ 0.78 -2.33∗∗∗ 0.32 0.77 -0.44 0.25∗
(0.74) (0.74) (0.86) (0.63) (0.61) (0.46) (0.13)
Between 50-75th 1.04 2.10∗∗ -2.85∗∗∗ 0.76 0.88 0.09 0.41∗∗
(0.81) (0.87) (0.90) (0.72) (0.82) (0.59) (0.18)
Between 75-90th 2.04∗ 2.82∗∗∗ -2.39∗∗ 0.82 -0.37 0.18 0.18
(1.11) (0.99) (1.12) (0.94) (0.96) (0.58) (0.18)
Top 10th 1.91 3.80∗∗∗ -3.92∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.97 0.72 0.36∗
(1.30) (1.31) (1.44) (1.17) (1.29) (0.88) (0.19)
Constant 15.73∗∗∗ 6.31∗∗∗ 49.35∗∗∗ 2.65 9.87∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ 0.48
(1.25) (1.67) (1.63) (1.64) (1.37) (0.85) (0.30)
Observations 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.401 0.359 0.312 0.143 0.143 0.128
Mean Dep. Variable 15.21 7.95 24.20 13.50 10.82 6.78 0.54
Village Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the village level.
Notes: [1] Each column is estimated using a linear probability model.
[2] The dependant variable is the proportion assigned by household i to project p.
[3] The base for the asset distribution is the bottom 25th quartile.
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Table 2.5: REDS HH Survey: Effect of Value of Assets on Proportions Assigned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
road irrig water sanit health educ social
Value of Assets 0.02 1.57∗∗ -0.93 -0.28 -0.18 0.70 0.03
(0.82) (0.77) (0.79) (0.88) (0.90) (0.60) (0.07)
Assets Squared 0.01 -0.12∗ 0.11∗∗ -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00)
Constant 16.17∗∗∗ 6.27∗∗∗ 48.73∗∗∗ 2.73∗ 10.39∗∗∗ 3.46∗∗∗ 0.56∗
(1.26) (1.59) (1.61) (1.62) (1.30) (0.84) (0.31)
Observations 6407 6407 6407 6407 6407 6407 6407
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.400 0.358 0.312 0.142 0.142 0.127
Mean Dep. Variable 15.22 7.95 24.21 13.50 10.82 6.78 0.54
Village Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the village level.
Notes: [1] Each column is estimated using a linear probability model.
[2] The dependent variable is the proportion assigned by household i to project p.
[3] The household characteristics include: occupational dummies; household composition; number of school going children;
age, gender, marital status and number of years of schooling of head of household.
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Table 2.6: REDS HH Survey: Effect of Land Distribution on Proportions Assigned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quartile road irrig water sanit health educ social
Between 25-50 0.74 1.51∗ -0.64 -0.36 -1.31∗ 0.16 0.06
(0.80) (0.77) (0.96) (0.77) (0.72) (0.54) (0.14)
Between 50-75 0.23 3.58∗∗∗ -0.96 1.15 -2.26∗∗∗ -0.12 -0.02
(0.71) (0.91) (0.97) (0.77) (0.68) (0.51) (0.13)
Top 25th 0.46 3.80∗∗∗ -0.64 -0.37 -1.47∗ 0.48 0.03
(0.87) (0.92) (0.99) (0.78) (0.88) (0.62) (0.18)
Constant 16.03∗∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗ 48.85∗∗∗ 2.94∗ 10.60∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗∗ 0.55∗
(1.28) (1.64) (1.60) (1.61) (1.28) (0.83) (0.32)
Observations 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.403 0.358 0.312 0.143 0.142 0.127
Mean Dep. Variable 15.21 7.95 24.20 13.50 10.82 6.78 0.54
Village Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the village level.
Notes: [1] Each column is estimated using a linear probability model.
[2] The dependant variable is the proportion assigned by household i to project p.
[3] The base for the land distribution is the bottom 25th quartile.
[4] The household characteristics include: occupational dummies; household composition; number of school going children;
age, gender, marital status and number of years of schooling of head of household.
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Table 2.7: REDS HH Survey: Effect of SC/ST status on Proportions Assigned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
road irrig water sanit health educ social
SC -1.29∗∗ -1.61∗ 1.00 0.71 0.43 -0.06 -0.00
(0.60) (0.87) (0.81) (0.56) (0.67) (0.40) (0.09)
ST -0.30 -1.61 -0.94 -0.91 1.16 0.55 -0.11
(1.33) (1.14) (1.18) (0.72) (1.11) (0.78) (0.09)
Between 25-50th Quartile 1.46∗ 0.69 -2.32∗∗∗ 0.32 0.82 -0.43 0.25∗
(0.74) (0.74) (0.86) (0.64) (0.61) (0.46) (0.13)
Between 50-75th Quartile 0.92 1.90∗∗ -2.80∗∗∗ 0.79 0.97 0.10 0.40∗∗
(0.80) (0.86) (0.91) (0.74) (0.82) (0.59) (0.18)
Between 75-90th Percentile 1.84 2.52∗∗ -2.28∗∗ 0.89 -0.26 0.19 0.17
(1.11) (1.03) (1.14) (0.97) (0.97) (0.59) (0.18)
Top 10th Percentile 1.64 3.43∗∗ -3.75∗∗ 0.06 -0.85 0.72 0.35∗
(1.32) (1.35) (1.45) (1.20) (1.31) (0.87) (0.19)
Constant 15.89∗∗∗ 7.29∗∗∗ 49.97∗∗∗ 3.24∗ 9.15∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ 0.55∗
(1.51) (1.94) (1.83) (1.83) (1.59) (0.98) (0.31)
Observations 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412 6412
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.402 0.360 0.312 0.143 0.142 0.128
Mean Dep. Variable 15.21 7.95 24.20 13.50 10.82 6.78 0.54
Village Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HH Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the village level.
Notes: [1] Each column is estimated using a linear probability model.
[2] The dependant variable is the proportion assigned by household i to project p.
[3] The base for the asset distribution is the bottom 25th quartile.
[4] The household characteristics include: occupational dummies; household composition; number of school going children;
age, gender, marital status and number of years of schooling of head of household.
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Table 2.8: MPLAD: Results of DID strategy, REStoGEN Treatment Group (2004-09)
Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treatment (REStoGEN) 6.66∗∗ -0.47 -2.63∗∗∗ -0.48 -0.48 2.74
(3.32) (0.65) (0.95) (0.44) (1.60) (2.58)
Post 2007 -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 0.03 0.16 0.14
(0.60) (0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (0.32) (0.46)
Treatment*Post -0.36 0.56∗∗ -0.39 0.45 0.03 -0.01
(1.64) (0.26) (0.42) (0.28) (0.69) (1.38)
Constant 25.37∗∗ 0.29 1.83 8.48∗∗∗ 26.15∗∗∗ 26.28∗∗∗
(10.91) (3.82) (5.15) (2.31) (6.28) (9.20)
Observations 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840
Adjusted R2 0.506 0.151 0.301 0.311 0.437 0.492
Mean Dep. Variable 39.31 2.27 6.25 2.10 11.48 19.82
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Char. YES YES YES YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level.
[1] Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population; proportion of
SC/ST HHs , average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools,
paved roads
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Table 2.9: MPLAD: Results of DID strategy, GENtoRES Treatment Group (2004-09)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treated (GEN to RES) -0.69 -0.83 0.77 0.12 -3.49∗∗ 1.99
(3.96) (0.69) (1.54) (0.52) (1.46) (3.43)
Post 2007 -0.10 -0.14 -0.02 -0.00 0.08 0.14
(0.63) (0.12) (0.17) (0.10) (0.32) (0.47)
Treated* Post 2007 0.71 0.60∗∗ 0.34 -0.00 -0.31 -1.06
(1.88) (0.30) (0.57) (0.19) (0.64) (1.79)
Constant 27.90∗∗ -0.50 2.64 9.82∗∗∗ 21.69∗∗∗ 20.05∗
(11.69) (3.97) (5.31) (2.47) (6.05) (10.26)
Observations 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880
Adjusted R2 0.452 0.238 0.290 0.318 0.465 0.435
Mean Dep. Variable 38.55 2.30 6.65 2.11 11.01 19.93
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Char. YES YES YES YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level.
[1] Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population; proportion of
SC/ST HHs , average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools, paved roads
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Table 2.10: MPLAD: Results of DID Strategy, Both Treatment Groups (2004-09)
Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treatment - Both 3.04 -0.69 -0.85 -0.20 -1.61 1.90
(2.85) (0.51) (1.08) (0.38) (1.21) (2.30)
Post 2007 -0.22 -0.16 0.37 0.10 0.30 -0.76
(0.71) (0.22) (0.25) (0.13) (0.32) (0.58)
Treated*Post 0.17 0.59∗∗ 0.04 0.20 -0.25 -0.50
(1.33) (0.25) (0.39) (0.19) (0.54) (1.23)
Constant 26.76∗∗ 0.31 1.34 8.81∗∗∗ 26.01∗∗∗ 20.57∗∗
(10.84) (3.48) (4.98) (2.18) (5.78) (9.35)
Observations 2039 2039 2039 2039 2039 2039
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.245 0.295 0.310 0.449 0.438
Mean Dependent Variable 39.30 2.28 6.38 2.04 11.06 19.85
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level.
[1] Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population; proportion of
SC/ST HHs , average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools, paved roads
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Figure 2.2: Perceived Probability of Winning and Competition
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Table 2.11: Isolating the Mechanism - DID Results in Strongholds (2004-09)
Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treatment - Both 0.61 -2.03 1.08 0.05 2.57 1.26
(5.45) (1.81) (2.26) (0.98) (3.21) (4.93)
Post 2007 -0.42 -0.44 0.88 0.68∗ 0.72 -1.00
(1.23) (0.41) (0.57) (0.39) (0.93) (0.91)
Treated*Post 0.48 0.08 0.18 -0.22 1.38 -3.46
(2.18) (0.67) (0.88) (0.37) (1.49) (2.51)
Constant 30.51 -8.95 -0.41 17.55∗ 26.75 2.68
(28.68) (10.00) (12.60) (9.05) (18.72) (18.97)
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564
Adjusted R2 0.576 0.430 0.474 0.308 0.593 0.707
Mean Dependent Variable 30.79 3.13 7.59 2.60 14.96 20.73
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level.
[1] Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population; proportion of
SC/ST HHs , average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools, paved roads
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Table 2.12: Isolating the Mechanism - DID Results in High Competition Constituencies
(2004-09)
Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treatment - Both -1.73 -1.13 -3.91∗∗ 0.66 -2.21 11.34∗
(6.11) (0.95) (1.80) (0.68) (1.53) (5.86)
Post 2007 -0.23 -0.14 -0.44 -0.23∗∗ -0.55∗ 0.13
(1.21) (0.11) (0.35) (0.10) (0.32) (0.82)
Treated*Post 3.15 0.42∗ 0.03 0.34 0.60 -2.09
(2.06) (0.24) (0.47) (0.21) (0.63) (2.43)
Constant 62.05∗∗∗ -0.96 1.69 11.36∗ 9.18 11.03
(22.03) (6.52) (7.95) (6.78) (11.12) (20.51)
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468
Adjusted R2 0.716 0.284 0.460 0.391 0.485 0.544
Mean Dependent Variable 41.19 1.63 5.75 1.54 8.44 21.39
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level.
[1] Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population; proportion of
SC/ST HHs, average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools, paved roads
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Table 2.13: MPLAD: DID Results, Log-linear Specification (2004-2009)
Dependent variable: log(1 + expenditureshare) on project i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treated 1.18 0.92 0.80* 0.98 0.83 0.95
(0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
Post 2007 0.98 1.02 1.10*** 1.02 1.02 0.96
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Treated*Post 1.03 1.11** 0.98 1.03 0.98 0.96
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 21.06*** 2.71** 2.08 6.99*** 28.41*** 17.84***
(9.48) (1.28) (1.06) (2.95) (14.06) (9.34)
Observations 2238 2238 2238 2238 2238 2238
Adjusted R2 0.426 0.250 0.346 0.372 0.403 0.445
Mean Dep. Variable 3.36 0.62 1.48 0.69 2.03 2.57
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Char. YES YES YES YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level
[1] Dependent variable is log(1 + expenditureshare) on project i.
[2] Coefficients are exponentiated (i.e. exp(log(1+ expenditure share))).
[3] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population; proportion of
SC/ST HHs, average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools, paved roads
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Figure 2.3: Placebo Test Outline
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Table 2.14: Results of Difference-in-difference Strategy - Placebo Test (1999-2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treatment - Both 0.65 -0.24 -0.60 -0.18 -0.51 1.76
(2.50) (0.57) (1.04) (0.28) (1.03) (2.04)
Post 2002 0.77 -0.28 -0.47 -0.15 0.26 -0.70
(1.15) (0.32) (0.73) (0.17) (0.54) (0.76)
Treated*Post2002 -2.28 -0.35 -0.08 -0.08 -0.24 2.59∗∗
(1.45) (0.46) (0.72) (0.23) (0.70) (1.21)
Constant 40.51∗∗∗ 5.31 11.08∗∗ 5.25∗∗∗ 17.72∗∗∗ 10.62
(9.60) (4.30) (4.74) (1.30) (4.81) (7.55)
Observations 3651 3651 3651 3651 3651 3651
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.194 0.230 0.287 0.354 0.375
Mean Dependent Variable 40.02 2.42 7.17 2.04 11.54 17.89
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level.
[1] Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population; proportion of
SC/ST HHs, average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools, paved roads
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Table 2.15: MPLAD: Results of DID (2004-09, Without Year 2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Treatment -Both 3.00 -0.72 -0.68 -0.31 -1.55 1.61
(2.94) (0.50) (1.03) (0.37) (1.21) (2.36)
Post 2007 -0.95 -0.00 0.40∗ 0.15 0.33 -0.41
(0.68) (0.15) (0.22) (0.13) (0.33) (0.50)
Treated*Post 0.41 0.60∗∗ 0.02 0.25 -0.22 -0.91
(1.44) (0.26) (0.41) (0.20) (0.58) (1.39)
Constant 28.31∗∗∗ 1.51 1.01 9.03∗∗∗ 25.10∗∗∗ 19.07∗∗
(10.50) (3.10) (4.84) (2.21) (5.65) (8.98)
Observations 1860 1860 1860 1860 1860 1860
Adjusted R2 0.475 0.230 0.297 0.289 0.435 0.435
Mean Dependent Variable 39.85 2.32 6.13 1.97 10.72 20.13
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
[1] Dependent variable is proportion of expenditure on project i.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population;
proportion of SC/ST HHs, average infrastructure availability for water, primary and
secondary schools, paved roads
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Table 2.16: MPLAD: Results of First Stage of IV Regression (2004-2009)
Dependent variable: probability that the incumbent wins next election
(1) (2) (3)
Treated -0.30∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Constant 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.28
(0.12) (0.12) (0.27)
Observations 2178 2178 2120
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.212 0.216
F-Statistic 85.86 85.86 63.61
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Party Fixed Efects NO YES YES
Constituency Characteristics NO NO YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
[1] Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level
[2] The dependent variable takes value 1 if the incumbent wins the next election and zero otherwise.
[3] In Column (3), Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population;
proportion of SC/ST HHs; average infrastructure availability for water, primary and secondary schools,
paved roads.
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Table 2.17: MPLAD: Results of 2SLS (2004-2007)
Dependent variable: change in expenditure from 2004-06 to 2008-09
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
road irrig water health educ comm cent.
Prob. of Winning -0.03 0.01** -0.05* -0.00 -0.03* 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant -0.05 -
0.07***
0.06*** 0.03*** -0.08* 0.13***
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 2051 2051 2051 2051 2051 2051
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.099 0.018 0.089 0.088 0.079
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Char. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at constituency level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
[1] Dependent variable looks at change in expenditure on project i from 2004-06 to 2008-09.
[2] Constituency characteristics include average village area; density of population;
proportion of SC/ST HHs; average infrastructure availability for water, primary and
secondary schools, paved roads
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Chapter 3
Politics of Bureaucratic Task Assignments
3.1 Introduction
In countries where the constitution separates the powers of the elected legislature and the
appointed executive body, many policy making decisions are taken together by the politi-
cian and top bureaucrats. The bureaucracy is insulated from political influence through
constitutional provisions. However, it is observed in various countries that the bureaucrats
are shuffled around many times in their careers, often due to political reasons. Wade (1985)
shows that in context of lower bureaucracy in India, "politicians are active in influencing
transfers." More recently, Iyer and Mani (2009) use data from Indian Administrative Ser-
vice to show that when political parties in power change, the probability of bureaucrats
being reassigned increases significantly. This suggests that politicians have influence over
task assignments despite constitutional provisions that ensure insulation from politiciza-
tion of the same.
If politicians can pull strings to get who they want, which bureaucrats do they choose?
And how does electoral competition affect the allocations? In this chapter, I argue that
politicians face a tradeoff between choosing bureaucrats with high ability and those more
closely aligned to them with respect to caste or ideology. On one hand, politicians will
want competent bureaucrats as successful policies lead to higher vote shares. On the other
hand, they want bureaucrats who have same ideology as them as that makes it easier for
them to execute policies.
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To analyze this tradeoff, I develop a simple model which first examines the relational con-
tract between politicians and bureaucrat for a given match. It then looks at the matching
pattern. The main idea is that if politician and bureaucrat are of different ideologies, the
effort cost for bureaucrat is much higher. The politicians in strongholds can use relation
contracts to incentivize their bureaucrats. The competitive politicians cannot do so, but
can substitute for these contracts by choosing bureaucrats who are of the same ideology.
The preliminary results show that the likelihood of the bureaucrats and politicians being of
the same caste is higher in competitive districts. Moreover, the bureaucrats in competitive
districts are more likely to be reassigned on an average. This is expected since political
turnover in competitive districts is higher than non-competitive districts. The results also
suggest that the bureaucrats take less time to approve projects when they are of the same
caste as the politicians.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: section 2 outlines the theoretical framework
while section 3 provides empirical evidence from India. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
This section examines the interaction between bureaucrats and politicians. The sequence
of events is as follows: bureaucrats are matched across politicians. Once matched, the
politicians assign projects to bureaucrats and depend on them to execute these projects.
We first study (following Bull (1987)) how electoral competition affects the relational con-
tract between the two actors, for a given matching pattern. We subsequently examine how
bureaucrats and politicians match with each other.
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3.2.1 The Environment
Consider a Bureaucrat B =< a, i > with ability a and ideology i. Let J =< j, p > de-
note the constituency-politician pair that a bureaucrat is matched to, where, j ∈ {H,L}
is the level of electoral competition in the constituency and p denotes the ideology of the
politician. Bureaucrats can either have a high ability or low ability such that A = {h, l}
and both politicians as well as bureaucrats can have either a left (t) ideology or a right (r)
ideology such that I = P = {t, r}.
There is a continuum of bureaucrats of Lebesgue measure 1. For simplicity it is assumed
that a continuum politician-constituency pairs are also of the same measure. Let ρai de-
note the measure of bureaucrats of type (a, i) and pijp denote the measure of constituency-
politician pairs being type (j, p).
In each period, the bureaucrat chooses an unobservable effort e that stochastically deter-
mines the output of the project y. The output can either be y(a, j) or zero. The effort level
e ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that y = y(a, j). The cost of putting in effort is e22 (1 + g(i, p)),
where g(i, p) is the cost of interference and g(i, p) = 0 if the politician and bureaucrat have
the same ideology.
The politician offers the bureaucrat a reward b in every period. This can be interpreted
as a letter of recommendation for the bureaucrat. The reward is paid if y = y(a, j). It
is assumed that the bureaucrat has to be guaranteed at least a zero payoff. The effort is
unobservable but the output is observable. If the output is y(a, j), the politician chooses
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whether to give the recommendation specified in the relational contract. We assume that
y(h,H) > y(l,H) = y(h, L) > y(l, L). Moreover, we assume y has increasing differences:
y(h,H)− y(l,H) ≥ y(h, L)− y(l, L).
The per-period payoff for the politician is given by UP = y(a, j)e− eb. The payoff for the
bureaucrat is given by: UB = eb− e22 (1 + g(i, p)).
3.2.2 The Repeated Game
To analyze the repeated game, consider the following strategies. The bureaucrat’s strategy
is to put in high effort in the first period. If the politician gives him the reward, then
the bureaucrat will continue to put in high effort. If in any period the politician does not
give the reward after bureaucrat put in the effort, the bureaucrat will never put in effort
thereafter. The politician’s strategy is to give a reward to the bureaucrat as long as he
puts in a high effort. If zero output is produced, then politician does not give the reward in
that period. Hence, punishments for zero output are all concentrated in the current period.
Let us now solve for the equilibrium. If the bureaucrat believes that the politician will
honor the relational contract, then his optimal effort solves the following problem:
maxe eb− e
2
2 (1 + g(i, p))
This gives us the following condition:
e∗ = b1 + g(i, p) (3.1)
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From the equation 3.1 we can see that the bureaucrat will put in non-zero effort as long as
b > 0. Now, the optimal reward that the politician offers should be enough to induce the bu-
reaucrat to ensure the bureaucrat attains at least a payoff of zero.. The politician’s expected
payoffs per period when the relational-contract reward is b is: Epi(b) = y(a, j)e∗(b)−be∗(b).
This expression helps us determine how large the reward of the bureaucrat should be.
Given the bureaucrat’s strategy, if the politician does not pay the bonus when the bureau-
crat works hard, the expected payoff of the politician is: y(a,j). This is because in future
the bureaucrat never works hard as the politician loses his reputation for rewarding out-
puts produced. On the other hand, if the politician pays the bonus, the expected payoff of
politician is y(a, j)−b+ 1r(j)Epi(b), where r(j) is the interest rate with 1 ≥ r(H) > r(L) ≥ 0.
This is because as competition increases, the politician is less likely to remain in office and
hence the interest rate is higher.
The politician will give the reward if an only if y(a, j)−b+ 1r(j)Epi(b) ≥ y(a, j). Simplifying,
we get the no-reneging constraint:
Epi(b) ≥ r(j)b
The politician maximizes his expected payoffs subject to the no-reneging constraint. The
problem can be written as:
maxb Epi(b)
s.t. Epi(b) ≥ r(j)b
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The solution to the problem depends on whether the constraint binds or not. If the con-
straint is slack, then the optimum level of the bonus is given by b∗ = y(a, j)/2. From (1),
we can see that the optimal effort level chosen by the bureaucrat will be: e∗ = y(a,j)2[1+g(i,p)] .
Given the ability of the bureaucrat, the optimal effort level will be higher in competitive
constituency since y(·, H) > y(·, L). The effort level is also higher when the bureaucrat
and the politician have the same ideology.
When the constraint binds, the optimal level of bonus payment is given by: b∗ = y(a, j)−
r(j)[1 + g(i, p)] and the effort level is e∗ = y(a,j)−r(j)[1+g(i,p)]1+g(i,p) . As in the first case, the effort
level will increase when the ideology of the bureaucrat and the politician are the same.
However, in this case, competition will increases level of effort if the following condition
holds:
y(·, H)− y(·, L) > [r(H)− r(L)](1 + g(i, p)) (3.2)
This assumption requires that the increase in output going from non-competitive to com-
petitive constituency should be higher than the increase in interest rate weighted by the
cost of interference. Hence, the effect of competition on optimal level of effort is ambiguous.
3.2.3 Bureaucrat-Politician Matches
From the above analysis, the expressions for the payoff functions for the politician can be
written as:
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UP =

r(j)
[
y(a, j)− r(j)(1 + g(i, p))
]
if y(a,j)2 < r(j)[1 + g(i, p)]
y(a,j)2
4(1+g(i,j)) otherwise
Imagine a central planner who allocates the bureaucrats across different politicians. His
objective is to maximize the sum of payoffs of different politicians. Let us start from the
case where there are equal number of each type of bureaucrats: ρh,r = ρh,t = ρl,r = ρl,t
and equal number of politicians pih,r = pih,t = pil,r = pil,t. Irrespective of whether the
no-reneging constraint binds or not, each type of politician wants the bureaucrat with the
same ideology. This is because UP increases when g(i, p) = 0. Since r(H) > r(L), the util-
ity cost of differences in caste is higher for competitive politicians. Moreover, in both cases,
UP is higher when the bureaucrat is of higher ability. Due to the assumption of increasing
differences and the fact that differences in caste is more costly for competitive politicians,
the (h, r) bureaucrats will be matched to (H, r) rather than (L, r) politicians. Similarly,
(h, t) bureaucrats will be matched to (H, t) politicians. The low ability bureaucrats will
be assigned to low competition constituencies. In this case, we should not see any effect of
competition on likelihood that bureaucrat and politician are of the same caste. However,
we should observe the bureaucrats to be of higher ability in competitive districts.
Consider now the case where high ability bureaucrats are scarce and stronghold (low compe-
tition constituencies) are scarce: ρh,r = ρh,t < ρl,r = ρl,t and piH,r = piH,t > piL,r = piL,t. In
this case, all (h, r) bureaucrats are assigned to (H, r) constituency-politician pair and (h, t)
bureaucrats to (H, t) pairs. In the rest of the vacant slots in high competition constituen-
cies, the (l, r) bureaucrats are assigned to (H, r) and (l, t) fill up the (H, t) constituencies.
The remaining low ability bureaucrats fill up low competition constituencies such that the
ideologies of the bureaucrats and politicians match. Given this assignment pattern, we
should observe a higher probability of bureaucrat and politician being of the same ideology
in high competition constituencies. Also, since all the scarce high ability bureaucrats are
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assigned to high competition constituencies, we should expect average ability level to be
higher in high competition constituencies.
Hence, there is an unambiguous effect of competition on the matching pattern. Moreover,
the pattern does not depend on the distribution of types.
3.2.4 Testable Predictions of The Model
The above results can be summarized in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The effect of competition on optimal level of effort is ambiguous. Compe-
tition increases optimal level of effort if y(·, H)− y(·, L) > [r(H)− r(L)](1 + g(i, p)).
Hypothesis 2: Increase in competition increases the probability that the politician and
bureaucrat are of the same caste.
Hypothesis 3: Increase in competition increases the probability that the bureaucrat is of
high ability.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Data
The information on bureaucrats is obtained from the Department of Personnel and Training
(DoPT) in India. The DoPT keeps the records of all IAS officers in the form of Executive
Record sheets. There is one ER sheet per bureaucrat. This provides us with information
about their name, their cadre, their educational background as well as all assignments since
the day they joined the civil services. We digitized these ERs in the form of a database
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and used it to figure out which bureaucrat was assigned as collector to which district over
the 1999-2009 period.
The personnel files allow us to get the caste categories of the bureaucrats. For this study,
we will use a coarse measure of castes - whether the bureaucrat belongs to general cate-
gory (GEN), scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribes (ST) or other backward classes (OBC)
classifications. It is possible to get a finer classification of castes based on the names of
the bureaucrats but it requires more data on caste classifications. It is something that
can be done in the future. The coarse caste classification for politicians comes from the
Election Commission of India. Table 3.1 tabulates joint caste distribution for politicians
and bureaucrats for the state of Uttar Pradesh. As we can see, 12.43% of the bureaucrat-
politician pairs are of SC-SC or OBC-OBC pairs. We will define the bureaucrats of being
of the same caste in two ways. A narrow definition includes those pairs that are either SC-
SC or OBC-OBC.1 When we look at the matching results, we will also consider a broader
definition where we include GEN-GEN pairs in the ‘same caste’ definition.
The bureaucratic data also allows us to measure ability of the bureaucrat. There is infor-
mation on the degrees obtained by each bureaucrat as well as classification of how well they
did in their class. We will look at their performance at the undergraduate level since all
candidates have at least obtained their undergraduate degrees. The classifications available
are gold medalist (those that got highest grades), first class with distinction, first class,
second class, third class/ pass. Table 3.2 gives the proportion of the bureaucrats that be-
long to each category. About 80% of the candidates obtained a first division. We will focus
on the two ends of the distribution. High ability bureaucrats are defined as those that got
either the gold medal or had first class with distinction. The low ability bureaucrats would
be the ones that just passed or had the third division.
1Following Iyer and Mani (2012), we assign constituencies to be OBC if Samajwadi party is in power.
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The election data is obtained from the Election Commission of India. We obtain data for
all parliamentary elections from 1989-2009. The main variable of interest is the extent of
political competition. We look at various measures of competition. The first one is victory
margin which uses information on vote shares of the winner and runner up. We use the
victory margin distribution to define low competition and high competition dummies. High
competition is the bottom 25th percentile of the distribution while low competition is the
top 25th percentile of the distribution. The second measure used to measure competition
is whether a constituency is a party stronghold or not. This measure looks at identity of
the party that won previous consecutive elections. This data also provides us with the
names of the winning candidates and their party affiliation.
3.3.2 Results
3.3.2.1 Competition and Ideology matching
We first examine how electoral competition affects the matching pattern between bureau-
crats and politicians. The model predicts that if the value of output is higher in competitive
districts and costs of ideological differences is high, then the likelihood of politicians and
bureaucrats being of same caste is higher in high competition constituencies. A common
method used to measure the degree of assortative matching is rank correlations.2 Ta-
ble 3.3 reports Kendall’s tau-b coefficients. The first row examines the rank correlation
between stronghold constituency and politician and bureaucrat being same reserved cat-
egory. The results show that in strongholds, the probability of observing same reserved
caste bureaucrat-politician pairs is 4% lower. Also, from row 2, we find that probability of
2See Kremer (1997) and Fernandez et al. (2005)
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observing a high ability candidate is 1.6% lower. These are consistent with Hypotheses 2
and 3 of the model.
Columns 1-2 in Table 3.4 look at the probability that the bureaucrat and politician are of
the same caste. From column (1), we see that in a stronghold constituency, the likelihood
that the bureaucrat and politician are of the same caste is significantly lower. If we broaden
the definition of same caste, then coefficient is not precisely estimated. One reason why the
estimate could be noisy is that even within GEN-GEN pair, the bureaucrat and politician
may be of different castes. To be able to obtain more precise estimates when incorporating
GEN-GEN pairs, we need more data that allows us to define a finer measure of castes.
Columns 3-4 look at the probability that the bureaucrat is of high ability. With the nar-
row definition, we can see that in strongholds, bureaucrats are 2% less likely to be of high
ability. This is consistent with the predictions of the model. If we define ability broadly,
80% of the sample becomes ‘high ability’. Since we cannot rank the bureaucrats within
the category of ‘First’, a finer measure of ability is needed to broaden the measure of high
ability.
In rest of the chapter, we will use the narrower definition for both the probability of being
of the same caste and for high ability.
3.3.3 Competition and Bureaucrat Assignment
Table 3.5 looks at the probability that a bureaucrat will be re-assigned at any given time.
The hypothesis is that the bureaucrats in competitive districts should be re-assigned more.
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This is because in competitive districts, the politicians get the bureaucrats of their own
ideology. Since there is a higher amount of political volatility in competitive districts, the
bureaucratic turnover should be higher in competitive districts as each new politician will
want a bureaucrat of same ideology. As we can see, the likelihood of being re-assigned
is about 17% lower in strongholds. This result is robust across specifications. Once we
control for competition, the high ability bureaucrats are significantly more likely to be
re-allocated. However, as the interaction term in column 3 shows, the high ability bureau-
crats in strongholds are significantly less likely to be re-allocated. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that bureaucratic turnover of high ability bureaucrats comes from higher
turnover of politicians in competitive constituencies. Now, in columns 4-5 we see the same
pattern for bureaucrats who are of the same reserved caste as politicians. However, the
estimates are less precise.
3.3.4 Competition, Matching and Bureaucratic Performance
One of the main results of the model was that the effort level is higher when the bureaucrat
and politicians are of the same caste. Table 3.6 examines this hypothesis for the two main
projects examined in chapter 2 of the thesis. For both irrigation and drinking water, the
time taken to approve is significantly lower when the bureaucrat and politician are of the
same caste. This remains robust to controlling for ability and levels of competition. The
magnitudes are very high for irrigation projects. This could be due to the fact that 34 of
the projects take more than 100 days to complete and 33 of these are in in constituencies
where bureaucrat and politicians are of the opposite caste.
When we look at the effect of competition on time taken to approve, we find that bu-
reaucrats take significantly more time to approve irrigation projects in high competition
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constituencies. From Hypothesis 1 in the model, this result holds when y(·, H)− y(·, L) <
[r(H)− r(L)](1 + g(i, p)).
Table 3.7 looks at the effect of ability on time taken to approve. The high ability bu-
reaucrats, on an average, take 25 days less to approve the projects while the low ability
bureaucrats take 25 days more than ‘mediocre’ bureaucrats. The results remain the same
when we control for level of competition. These results are consistent with the assumptions
of the model: for a given type of constituency, higher ability bureaucrat puts more effort
than a low ability bureaucrat. As we saw in table 3.6, the time taken to approve is higher
in competitive districts and lower in low competition constituencies. These estimates, how-
ever, are noisier once we control for ability.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examined the effect of competition on allocation of bureaucrats across different
constituencies. The results show that [1] the likelihood of the bureaucrats and politicians
being of the same caste is higher in competitive districts, [2] the bureaucrats in competitive
districts are more likely to be reassigned on an average, [3] bureaucrats that are of the same
caste as the politician approve the projects faster, [4] bureaucrats who are of high ability
approve projects faster and the low ability ones approve projects slower.
These results suggest that even if the competitive politicians cannot use future rewards to
incentivize their bureaucrats, they can substitute this by getting bureaucrats of the same
ideology and get faster approvals, especially if the bureaucrats are of low ability.
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Table 3.1: Caste Distributions
Politician’s Caste
Bureaucrat’s Caste GEN OBC SC ST Total
GEN 28.77 16.05 18.67 0.00 63.50
OBC 3.83 5.35 4.51 0.00 13.69
SC 6.71 4.29 7.08 0.00 18.08
ST 1.93 1.09 1.71 0.00 4.73
Total 41.25 26.79 31.97 0.00 100.00
Table 3.2: Defining Ability
Grades Classification Proportion
Gold Medalist/ Distinction 2.72
First Class 79.21
Second Class 10.94
Third Class/Pass 7.13
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Table 3.3: Kendall’s tau-b Coefficients
Variables Tau-b coefficient p-value
Same Caste and Stronghold -0.037 0.000
High Ability and Stronghold -0.016 0.002
[1] The null hypothesis is that the two variables are independent.
[2] Same caste is a dummy that takes value 1 for SC-SC or OBC-OBC pairs.
[3] High ability refers to those bureaucrats who were gold medalists or got distinction.
[4] Tau-b coefficients are (-) and significant for broader definitions of same caste and high ability.
Table 3.4: Exploring Role of Ideology Matching
Same Caste Bureaucrat High Ability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stronghold -0.06*** -0.04 -0.02* 0.16***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Constant 0.02 0.27*** 0.00 0.56***
(0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.14)
Observations 34930 34930 16004 16004
R2 0.018 0.023 0.025 0.025
Mean Dependent Variable 0.06 0.20 0.03 0.82
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency level.
[1] In columns (1)-(2), dependent variable is whether politician and bureaucrat are of same caste.
Column (2) includes general category while column (1) only looks at reserved castes.
[2] In columns (3)-(4), dependent variable is whether bureaucrat is of high ability.
Column (4) is a broader measure and includes ‘First Division’ candidates.
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Table 3.5: Effect of Competition on Bureaucrat Assignment
Dependent variable: probability of being reassigned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stronghold -0.18* -0.17* -0.16* -0.18* -0.17*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
High Ability 0.15* 0.22**
(0.09) (0.10)
High Ability* Stronghold -0.39**
(0.17)
Same Reserved Caste 0.04 0.07
(0.13) (0.20)
Same Caste* Stronghold -0.05
(0.25)
Observations 11511 11511 11511 11511 11511
R2 0.029 0.033 0.036 0.030 0.030
Mean Dependent Variable 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Term Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level.
Dependent variable is the probability a bureaucrat will be transferred in any given month.
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Table 3.6: Exploring Role of Ideology Matching on Time Taken to Approve
Drinking Water Irrigation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Same Caste -45.23** -24.64** -47.49** -119.46** -123.45** -119.46**
(18.42) (10.81) (20.30) (49.57) (47.18) (49.57)
High Competition -0.93 98.10***
(8.74) (20.22)
High Comptt* Same Caste -24.50 0.00
(21.34) (0.00)
Low Competition -5.47 -33.84*
(8.79) (18.64)
Low Comptt* Same Caste 22.02 0.00
(21.84) (0.00)
Constant -2.50 -1.19 30.56** -58.39 10.57 -58.39
(17.04) (24.98) (15.17) (38.16) (37.72) (38.16)
Observations 1336 1336 1336 248 248 248
R2 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.518 0.544 0.518
Mean Dependent Variable 48.11 48.11 48.11 50.23 50.23 50.23
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constituency Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at constituency level.
Dependent variable is average time taken by the bureaucrat to complete projects in a district-constituency.
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Table 3.7: Exploring Role of Abilities on Time Taken to Approve
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Ability -24.76* -4.72
(13.83) (17.42)
Low Ability 25.94** 23.25**
(10.12) (11.10)
High Competition 3.89 5.11
(4.94) (5.33)
Low Competition -5.81 -0.39
(9.77) (9.92)
Observations 33112 33112 33112 33112
R2 0.167 0.165 0.166 0.166
Mean Dependent Variable 61.53 61.53 61.53 61.53
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Constituency Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level.
Dependent variable is average time taken by the bureaucrat to complete projects in a district-constituency.
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